Laplander may refer to: Something from or related to Lapland (region) Sami people, or anyone else living in the area of Lapland. Laplander, also used in English contexts for the Finnish speaking population in Finnish Lapland. Volvo Laplander L3314, a type of military vehicle produced by Volvo.
The Sámi people are an indigenous Finno-Ugric people inhabiting Sápmi, which today encompasses large northern parts of Norway and Sweden, northern parts of Finland, and the Kola Peninsula within the Murmansk Oblast of Russia.
Nymph bug - Issus coleoptratus (nymph). This Tiny Insect Contains the Only Mechanical Gears Ever Found in Nature.
A tiny ‘mechanical’ insect once helped experts get their brains into gear… quite literally! While the natural and mechanical worlds seem poles apart, the ‘Issus coleoptratus’, commonly referred to as a nymph bug, showed they’re actually closely linked.
In 2013 this little creature – a ‘planthopper’ commonly seen in Europe and North Africa, which measures up to 0.28 ins – was discovered to house an astonishing organic propulsion system. A report published in Science reveals the Issus’ skeleton had gears in its hind legs.
Authors and biologists Malcolm Burrows and Gregory Sutton observed “hind-leg joints with curved cog-like strips of opposing ‘teeth’ that intermesh, rotating like mechanical gears to synchronise the animal’s legs when it launches into a jump”, as described in their press release on EurekAlert. Their findings illustrate the “first observation of mechanical gearing in a biological structure.”
Issus coleoptratus - This would certainly have been news to the Greek mechanics of Alexandria, who are believed to have invented the mechanical gear in approx. 300 B.C.E. Turns out Mother Nature had them licked from the get go.
Burrows and Sutton used a combination of high speed video and experiments with dead Issus to reach this conclusion. The video gave them a precise look at the insects in action. Meanwhile, electrical stimulation of a single leg made it extend, hence triggering the other leg and showing the gears working together.
The release states that the insect’s inner-workings “bear remarkable engineering resemblance to those found on every bicycle and inside every car gear-box.” And that’s not all, because the design is also pretty sophisticated.
“Each gear tooth has a rounded corner at the point it connects to the gear strip; a feature identical to man-made gears such as bike gears – essentially a shock-absorbing mechanism to stop teeth from shearing off.”
Issus coleoptratus not only relies on its gears to hop from plant to plant. It needs the mechanism to keep on the right track. “To jump, both of the insect’s hind legs must push forward at the exact same time,” explains Smithsonian.com. “Because they both swing laterally, if one were extended a fraction of a second earlier than the other, it’d push the insect off course to the right or left, instead of jumping straight forward.” This makes the little bug a perfect jumping machine.
It uses toothed gears (magnified above with an electron microscope) to precisely synchronize the kicks of its hind legs as it jumps forward. (Image courtesy of Malcom Burrows).
The breakdown reads almost like an engine manual: “Each gear strip in the juvenile Issus was around 400 micrometres long and had between 10 to 12 teeth,” says the press release, “with both sides of the gear in each leg containing the same number – giving a gearing ratio of 1:1.”
However there are ways in which the insect differs from a straightforward machine. “Unlike man-made gears, each gear tooth is asymmetrical and curved towards the point where the cogs interlock – as man-made gears need a symmetric shape to work in both rotational directions, whereas the Issus gears are only powering one way to launch the animal forward.”
The gears are located on the top segment of each of the insect’s hind legs (Image courtesy of Malcolm Burrows) - One puzzling feature is that the gears are only present in the juvenile/nymph stage. Once the Issus develops fully, it replaces the old system with what Science refers to as a “high-performance friction-based mechanism”. It’s thought as the insect reaches adulthood, it isn’t able to grow back any broken gears due to the molting process.
This is “when animals cast off rigid skin at key points in their development in order to grow”. Molting repairs any damage, so once the process stops a more durable solution is supplied by nature.
Having what amounts to a built-in machine isn’t exclusive to the Issus. A cog wheel turtle, for instance, is named after the cog visible on its shell. Yet this doesn’t serve any practical purpose, aside from looking decorative. Speculation on exactly how the ancient animal kingdom was powered will no doubt continue. In the meantime, the Issus is a brilliant example of how mechanics are about blood and guts, as much as oil and grease.
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2020/01/02/mechanical-insect/amp/
The biggest problem for the Tang dynasty, which preceded the Song dynasty, were the military villages or 藩镇。The Tang dynasty had to deal with the An Lushan Rebellion and before that, fought the Battle of Talas with the Arab Islamic armies in central Asia.
These rebellions gave rise to the military villages and officials called the 都督， which were militarily and financially independent from the imperial court in Chang'an. Gradually, they exercised more independence, and the Tang dynasty collapsed into the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, where you had numerous dynasties fighting among each other to unify China.
It is worth noting that the founder of the Song dynasty 赵匡义 was himself a general with the Liao dynasty, but did not seek leadership of his army. Instead, he was selected by his own army to become their leader, and only reluctantly decided to become emperor. Among all of China's dynastic founders, he was the only to be like this.
After he had come to rule, he called all his generals together at a banquet, and asked them to give up their military powers. This is the source of the Chinese saying 举杯释兵权。 Unlike other dynasty founders, instead of executing his generals, he gave them generous pensions, and told them to retire.
What makes Zhao interesting is that by not executing his generals, he set the tone for the whole Song dynasty: he was a military leader who only reluctantly used military power.
Before getting into the reasons for why the Song did not choose to use military force, it is worth remembering that it lasted for nearly 300 years, which is the general standard for Chinese dynasties. The dynasty was more focused on political theory and commerce than the Tang dynasty, and there was less influence from central Asia than during previous dynasties.
For a long time, I believe that the Song believed that their mastery of the arts, culture and commerce gave them an advantage over the Jurchen and the Mongols, and that the Song court would be able to buy them off.
The weakness and fallacy of this policy was the Jingling Incident in 1127, and the Song dynasty lost northern China. Although the Song dynasty was able to repel the Mongols for another hundred years, its fate was largely sealed.
In terms of culture, the arts and commerce, the Song dynasty was the greatest dynasty China has had, and no other dynasties have lived up to its legacy. Its loss has been a tragedy for the Chinese people and for all of east Asia.
Song Dynasty had a great economy and a great cultural history, but a bad governance. In my opinion, Song failed militarily due to two key reasons.
Its emperors and society were focused on peaceful ways and did not feel the gravity of the challenges of war they had faced.
It stymied the efforts of successful generals like Yu Fei due to its timid policy that the aggressive invaders can be placated with tributes and eventually everything will be alright.
The first and the most important reason, why a state exists is to protect its society and people from the foreign invasion. The very reason why the emperor is an emperor and a king is a king and the government controls the means of violence is to fulfill this purpose. Otherwise, it should not exist.
Song was probably, economically and culturally, one of the most successful dynasties of ancient China. However, it failed to fulfill the first and the most important pact of its Mandate of Heaven, defend its country militarily against the foreign invasions.
Song did have several chances and many decades( over two centuries) to solve this dilemma. But its emperors and ruling society, who had the power to deal with the issue, couldn’t and perhaps, wouldn’t.
Song made technological innovations like gun powder weapons, like the hand thrown fire bomb below. But they were not the game changers, because it may be very useful in the siege warfare, which allowed Song to continue until 1279; but in the open field warfare, northern nomadic cavalry, with its speed and maneuverability, was the dominant force in the battle. Northern nomads also adopted the gunpowder weapons eventually.
Song had earlier lost two important military assets. First, was the occupation of Sixteen Territories north of Yellow River, to Khitan Liao. Second was the occupation of Gansu by Western Xia of Tanguts. In my opinion, the loss of Gansu was more detrimental to Song’s military prospects.
The loss of Sixteen Territories meant the loss of Great Wall defenses and the fertile civilized areas of Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi. However, the Great Wall never really protected Chinese dynasties from the nomadic incursions. There were always the weak points in the Great Wall that nomadic armies found to focus their strengths or they bypassed it by invading from the less well defended Hexi Corridor to the west.
It was the strong forces of strong dynasties of China that defeated the nomadic armies from conquering China. When the nomad armies breached the wall, difficult terrain hindered them from moving swiftly. While there was a delay, Chinese counter forces would be sent to battle them. If the nomad armies were defeated, they lacked the manpower and the resources to mount another invasion for many decades.
It is the complacent attitude “We have the Great Wall”, “We have the Huanghe” or “We have the Yangzi River” that resulted in the fall of Chinese dynasties like Song. Eventually, if the Chinese dynasty is militarily weak, the invader will find the will and the force to breach these defenses and conquer the rich civilization south of these barriers.
The loss of Gansu meant the loss of the grazing grounds and the stables of war horses developed since Han Dynasty and which made Han, Jin(晋), Sui, and Tang into true superpowers of Asia. So, in my opinion, this was more devastating loss for the Song Dynasty.
But although Song cavalry force was not at the level of powerful dynasties like Sui, Tang, and Han, it did manage to raise 200,000 cavalry by importing horses from Dali and Tibetans. This was not a small number, compared to the cavalry of northern nomadic empires. Genghis Khan’s Mongols numbered about 120,000 cavalry forces at the onset( Secret History of Mongols) in 1206 and when it first invaded Jin.
Although the number of horses each Mongolian soldiers had is thought to be 5–6, entire size of its army was still about 120,000 or less. It still overcame both the Western Xia and Jin Dynasty’s more numerous forces. So the numbers were not the determinant factor in Mongol victories. It was the superior commanders, tactics, training and battle experiences of the Mongol soldiers that allowed them to overcome more numerous enemies.
Chinese never had a lifestyle of northern nomads, who grew up riding, using archery, and often went to battles at ages of fifteen or even younger. So in order to overcome this problem, it had to make its recruits professional soldiers to learn how to wield weapons and ride horses. History shows that it may not take decades or a radical change of lifestyles to achieve this.
The troops under Yue Fei, called Yuejiajun(岳家军), were considered invincible against the more numerous Jin forces. In 1630, Yuan Chonghuan’s Ming forces dealt a first field defeat of the contingent of Manchu forces at the Battle of Beijing. So you need a great commander, who will mould the recruits into capable soldiers.
During the reign of Emperor Shenzong , Prime Minister Wang Anshi tried radical reforms to curb corruption and the power of the upper class, to increase the taxes and grow the military. But his reforms were rolled back after his death by the forces of Sima Guang.
Emperor Huizong was more interested in painting, arts and Taoism. He was an accomplished painter and contributed to the cultural development of Song Dynasty. But he is more renowned in history for Jingkang Humiliation(靖康之恥) in 1127, where he and his son Emperor Qinzong, along with many ministers and royal family members were captured by Jurchen Jin forces at Kaifeng and taken to Beijing.
He suffered the humiliation of being given a title of Hundegong (昏德公: Duke of Confused Virtue). His son, Qinzong was given a title of Zhonghunhou( 重昏侯:Very Confused Marquis). Well, such sarcastic titles are deserving for the pathetic rulers, who were really confused about their roles as the emperors.
There were rumors, most of which were fantastically tragic, how their Jin captors treated the imperial family and the ministers. Although most of it probably was greatly exaggerated, Huizong and Qinzong died near the present day Harbin tending the small farms like the commoners, while some of their wives and daughters ended up as prostitutes among Jurchens.
Chinese drama of Yue Fei shows the captured Song imperial family being sent to the animal cages and forced to eat the waste food for the animals. It is based on the some of the unofficial records handed down about the fate of Huizong and Qinzong in Jurchen Jin custody, much like the fate of Roman emperor Valerian in Sasanian kingdom.
After the Jingkang Incident, the remaining Song government fled to Hangzhou, setting up the Southern Song Dynasty. But still, Emperor Gaozong making Qin Hui, who was once held captive of Jin after the Jingkang Incident and later freed, as the prime minister did not help.
Qin Hui was against the aggressive warlike positions of Yue Fei and accused the general of treason to the dim witted emperor Gaozong, who had Yue Fei executed. This was after Yue Fei had successfully captured the Fort of Yancheng from Jin, which just lay south of Kaifeng. Such treacherous acts like this was an indication that Song court did not come to its senses after the humiliation of Jingkang.
After the execution of Yue Fei, Song empire agreed to pay Jin Dynasty annual tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 rolls of silk in 1141. The treaty can be compared to the Treaty of Nanjing signed after the First Opium War, which severely weakened the Qing finances and contributed to its decline. After the defeat by Yuan Mongols at the Battle of Yamen in 1279, the last Song pretender, Zhao Bing, committed suicide by falling into the river, ending the Song Dynasty.
1. Song Dynasty never managed to conquer the part of Northern China where the Great Wall was located. It is probably the only major dynasty that didn't have the Great Wall as protection. Had the Song Dynasty had the Great Wall, the history of the world probably have to be re-written, as Mongolians probably couldn't get very far later without knowledge of how to lay siege to a Chinese city.
2. Song Dynasty was established by staging a military coup. As result, the royal family never trust the armed forces and was constantly trying to ensure the army was in check, even at the expense of fighting effectiveness.
3. The "barbarians" which Song Dynasty were dealing with were very different from the traditional nomadic barbarians before AND after (Mongols). They were relatively "civilized": They had a written language, had a government modeled after the Han Chinese, had permanent settlements/cities. Thus, they were able to wage war with proper logistical support much like the way typical Chinese waged warfare, along with their inherent cavalry advantages.
Having said all that, *PERSONALLY*, I think the fact that Song Dynasty didn't have the protection of the Great Wall is the deciding factor.
Without the Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun. the Song had lost the major advantage that the Chinese traditionally held against invasions from the north—the northern walls. This meant the Song army had to go against the heavy cavalry of the Khitans, Jurchens, and later Mongols with their infantry-based troops in open plains.
As if losing the fortification at the northern frontier wasn’t bad enough, the geography put the Song at far greater disadvantage. The Song literally had to fight an uphill battle to retake the walls!
These factors severely limited the projection capacity of the Song army and confined Chinese activities to the south of the wall. As a result, the Song army had to always stay on the defensive side. Even on offensive campaigns, the goal of the Chinese was always the same—to recover lost territories.
This made Chinese operations astonishingly predictable, as there would only be several places on which the Chinese might launch their attack. On the other hand, the Khitans could launch an attack on the Chinese side anywhere from the north and there’s little stopping the mobility of their cavalry.
One well-known reason is that the risk of generals seizing power, as happened in the destructive civil wars that destroyed the Tang state, led the Song to restrain the military and emphasize the civilian bureaucracy.
Another is that the Inner Asian nomadic threat had moved from the west to the north. The cycle of barbarians settling in Guanzhong (the valley around Xi'an) and forming vigorous states that conquered the North China Plain, often later moving their capitals downstream, had repeated multiple times in the Zhou, Qin, and others.
The new point of entry for proto-Mongol and proto-Manchu peoples was the Beijing area, and the Song never gained control of this area, known as the Sixteen Prefectures, for more than a couple of years. Starting in the mid-Song, Beijing became the capital for large northern states and then China as a whole.
1.Political policy base on "重文抑武”,which is emphasizing literature and restricting military force.
2. the military Command system: “更戍法”（Law of troop rotation）let the elite troops from all over the empire rotation to nation capital in order to let empire control the forces made the situation of "兵不知将，将不知兵”（Soldiers and officers are not familiar with each other）,that decrease the military battle effectiveness.Even,before the troops go to fight,empire will give the battle formation order to generals to force them obey it ,not obey the battlefield situation.
3.The military force units structure： Elite force 禁军 ，which means as Praetorian Guard as Rome，turned to professional civil servants not army after middle-term of the dynasty，except the frontier border force 西军 of the west.
Common force 厢军，changed from the second line reserve force to workers even servants of civilian officers. And when natural disasters happens，government recruiting refugees to the army to avoid them uprising,also decrease the military battle effectiveness.
4.Military mobility： Song dynasty lost the stud-farm area in the north and northwest China made it has not enough cavalry force against the nomadic forces，although Song has the biggest heavy armored infantry forces in China history. It is impossible to give the enemy devastating strike,just could defend.
1. Song lost the control of grassland so it has nowhere to raise horses. Horses are extremely important in cold weapon era, like tanks in WWII. Lacking of horses means at least Song doesn't have the ability to attack the nomad - they can simply run away.
2. Song lost the control of 燕山 (Yan mountain), where the Great Wall (east segment) was built on. That means the door of Song is wide open to the nomad.
I don't think the policy of 强干弱枝 (strengthen the stem and weaken the branches, which basically means to put the most military strength under the direct control of the central government) has much impact.
It is because they had optimistic view about the possibility of their enemies had being become civilized. Song was the most civilized nation in human history, and only Joseon dynasty of the Korean Peninsula can be compared to Song.
The episodes of the time of the Song's destruction is a literary epic that Shakespeare's fiction is no match for. These two countries are treasure-like assets of humanity. The Chinese should be proud of the Song Dynasty.
Song Dynasty failed to recapture the northern territories of China, where was the main supply base for warhorses. The impierial army of Song as a result never had a strong cavalry forces like Tang or Ming dynasty, which gave them severe disadvantage against the north horsemen in North China Plain.
It had extremely strong neighbours. It failed to conquer the nomads to the north in its early days, when it was strongest. It only re-united part of what the Tang Dynasty had ruled.
Also there is no strong corelation between good government and military success. Chinese civilisation maybe benefited overall by giving the military a secondary role.
https://www.quora.com/Why-was-the-Song-dynasty-militarily-unsuccesful-despite-their-great-governance-and-economy
Growing your own giant sequoia - Out of fascination for these big trees a lot of people are wondering: could I plant a giant redwood in my garden? Could I grow a giant sequoia from seed?
The answer is: yes you can, provided you're living in a temperate climate zone. More about the world regions where giant sequoias have been planted successfully, can be found here.
But you have to keep in mind that giant sequoia (Sequoiadendron giganteum) are not fit for small city gardens. This might not come as a surprise but I have seen this tree planted very often in locations that were not well suited, as this species is a vigorous grower and can reach a height of 10 m (30 ft) after 10 years, and reaches a height of 30 m (100 ft) to 40 m (130 ft) after 50 years. A giant sequoia is not fit to plant as a small ornamental tree, but reaches its full potential as a landmark tree that can grown without restraints.
Before you enthusiastically imagining gigantic scenes: please keep in mind that, although the giant redwood is a vigorous grower according to plant terms, this species is living at another pace as you are. When you'll be, hopefully, an elderly person, your giant sequoia will only have grown through his first toddler years. In one human life the giant sequoia is able to reach a girth of 4 to 5 m (13 to 16 ft). Do you want to plant one anyway? Please go ahead and think about the next generations, that will hopefully be able to see this tree as a true giant.
You can grow giant sequoias by either sowing, striking cuttings or buying a little tree. More about growing the two other sequoia species: the coast redwood (Sequoia sempervirens), and the dawn redwood (Metasequoia glyptostroboides).
Sowing - Growing a giant redwood or a giant sequoia (Sequoiadendron) from seed is not the easiest thing in the world, but it's certainly not impossible. After giving it a few unsuccessful tries myself, I finally got some seeds to germinate and am now the proud owner of some baby giant redwoods!
Where to get your seeds? To grow giant sequoias from seed, first thing you need to do of course is to get some seeds. There are two ways to do that. First you can buy them from nurseries/seed companies. For the Europeans amongst you, there are a number of good British or German nurseries that offer Sequoiadendron seeds (the tree is sometimes called Wellingtonia in British English and Mammutbaum in German).
More fun to do as a home gardener, is to collect the seeds yourself. Bought seeds should originate from mature trees in the natural range of the trees, the Sierra Nevada range in California, and are the most likely ones to germinate.
Trees planted in Europe, Eastern US, Asia, and South America are not yet as old as the old growth Californian redwoods. The oldest ones are only now starting to make the transition from toddlers into teenagers and are only now starting to produce viable seeds. So when you collect them yourself, try to collect cones from trees that are as old as possible.
[Cone] - The image above shows a cone of a Belgian redwood, the giant sequoia of Esneux, which is largely bigger than the cones of trees with a girth below 6 to 7 m (about 20 feet). The giant sequoia is monoecious, which means that the male and female parts are located on the same tree. So for pollinated, viable seeds you only need one tree, it's not necessary that there are other giant redwoods in the immediate neighborhood.
It can take only a couple of years to a number of decades before a giant redwood starts producing cones. I have seen sequoias only 1.5 m (5 feet) tall with an abundance of cones and trees up to 20 m (about 60 feet) tall, with no cones at all.
Probably they are forced to produce cones after a stress period, such as a long period of drought, as survival mechanism. Fallen green cones are also ideal to collect: when they open after a couple of weeks in a dry place, they are loaded with small, winged seeds.
[Seeds] - The biggest cones also produce the biggest seeds. On the left you can see some seeds from the Belgian giant sequoias of Oostmalle, on the right those of the one of Esneux, mentioned above. There's a distinguishable difference in size (scale in cm).
Sowing - Before sowing, it might be useful to place the seeds a couple of days to a couple of weeks in the fridge. When you sow them at last and place them in a warm place (like on the radiator of your heating system), the seeds "think" winter's over and the time to germinate has come.
I have tried the seeds at different depths and had the most success when I did not put them in the (ordinary) compost, but on the soil, not to only very slighty covered. Probably they also need light to germinate. But be aware! The seeds need to be in (intense) contact with the moist soil, so you need to press them softly into the compost. The seeds are quite susceptible to drought.
You can put a glass plate or some plastic foil over the pot, but you have to be careful not to kill them by making things too wet. Small germinated sequoias die rather easy because of overwatering. I can tell you: it's a very sad thing to see baby sequoias wither away!
http://gramha.com/explore-hashtag/andromedan
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To keep the ground moist but not wet, it's ideal to use a garden sprayer instead of a watering can. You can sow them all year round, but because the plants in temperate regions like Europe will grow best in summer, it might be best to do the sowing in (early) spring. Seeds that germinated here (Belgium) around Christmas, have not grown noticeably until spring.
How long does it take the seeds to germinate? Well, first of all it should be said that giant sequoia seeds have a very low chance of germinating. If a few from some twenty to fifty seeds germinate, you're already successful... With bought seeds, the germination rate is higher but it's highly probable that more than half of the seeds will do nothing.
Readers of the website who already tried this, have had germination rates of 15 to 25%. The seeds germinate at the earliest a couple of days after sowing, but still can after months. Don't think things will not work out: patience is a virtue!
When a seed germinates, the first thing you see is a tiny, rhubarb colored stem, loop shaped. After a couple of days the plant erects itself and the dried seed skin falls of (if it does not look like it's going to do that by itself, you could help a little bit). You see four seed leaves, although there can be three or five (like on the image below).
On this image, the baby giant sequoia is a week and a half old. The height is about 2 cm (an inch). The first, careful steps in the life of a beautiful and fascinating tree, that is likely to become a giant that will outlive me multiple times.
Striking cuttings - Growing giant redwoods (Sequoiadendron giganteum) from cuttings is also possible, but I do not have much experience with that. Once I managed to get a few through the winter. When they started growing new green tips in spring, I planted them in the hope that they would root, but sadly that didn't work.
The use of a rooting hormone like IBA, adjusted compost, and some more trial and error experience would probably dramatically increase the chance of success. When you're striking cuttings, please do so late in season when the growing of the new offspring is still strong, but the wood has already hardened somewhat.
You should also strike your cuttings from trees as young as possible. For the Europeans/Aussies among us, the older trees could be used too, since all planted trees are not "old" yet. The different horticultural varieties or cultivars are all propagated by grafting.
Buying - For those who do not have the patience to experiment with seeds or cuttings, giant sequoias are also available in most of the tree nurseries. They are not the most common trees, but are not hard to find. Once in a while I see them in European garden shops with prices varying from 7 euro to 25 euro (8 to 30 dollars) for a tree 30 cm (1 ft) tall.
Also the variety 'Pendulum' is not very hard to find. Specialized tree nurseries have larger trees available, but those can be very expensive. The two other redwood species - The two other sequoia species, the coast redwood (Sequoia sempervirens) and the Dawn Redwood (Metasequoia glyptostroboides), can be grown from seed more easily (more than half of the seeds germinate). Nevertheless these species can be propagated best (and definately the dawn redwood) by making cuttings. In contrast to the giant sequoia, these cuttings root easily to very easily.
https://www.monumentaltrees.com/en/trees/giantsequoia/growing_your_own/
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The Jurchen rulers of the Jin dynasty collected tribute from some of the nomadic tribes living on the Mongol steppes and encouraged rivalries among them. When the Mongols were unified under Khabul in the 12th century, the Jurchens encouraged the Tatars to destroy them, but the Mongols were able to drive Jin forces out of their territory.
The Tatars eventually captured Khabul's successor, Ambaghai, and handed him over to the Jin imperial court. Emperor Xizong of the Jin dynasty had ordered Ambaghai executed by crucifixion (nailed to a wooden mule).
The Jin dynasty also conducted regular punitive expeditions against the Mongol nomads, either enslaving or killing them. In 1210, a delegation arrived at the court of Genghis Khan (r. 1206–27) to proclaim the ascension of Wanyan Yongji to the Jin throne and demanded the submission of the Mongols as a vassal state.
Because the Jurchens defeated the powerful steppe nomads and allied with the Keraites and the Tatars, they claimed sovereignty over all the tribes of the steppe.
High court officials in the Jin government defected to the Mongols and urged Genghis Khan to attack the Jin dynasty. But fearful of a trap or some other nefarious scheme, Genghis Khan refused. Upon receiving the order to demonstrate submission, Genghis Khan reportedly turned to the south and spat on the ground; then he mounted his horse, and rode toward the north, leaving the stunned envoy choking in his dust. His defiance of the Jin envoys was tantamount to a declaration of war between the Mongols and Jurchens.
After Genghis Khan returned to the Kherlen River, in early 1211, he summoned a kurultai. By organising a long discussion, everyone in the community was included in the process. The Khan prayed privately on a nearby mountain.
He removed his hat and belt, bowed down before the Eternal Sky, and recounted the generations of grievances his people held against the Jurchens and detailed the torture and murder of his ancestors. He explained that he had not sought this war against the Jurchens. At the dawn on the fourth day, Genghis Khan emerged with the verdict: "The Eternal Blue Sky has promised us victory and vengeance".
Wanyan Yongji, angry on hearing how Genghis Khan behaved, sent the message to the Khan that "Our Empire is like the sea; yours is but a handful of sand ... How can we fear you?"
When the conquest of the Tangut-led Western Xia empire started, there were multiple raids between 1207–1209.[6] When the Mongols invaded Jin territory in 1211, Ala 'Qush, the chief of the Ongut, supported Genghis Khan and showed him a safe road to the Jin dynasty's heartland. The first important battle between the Mongol Empire and the Jin dynasty was the Battle of Yehuling at a mountain pass in Zhangjiakou which took place in 1211.
There, Wanyan Jiujin, the Jin field commander, made a tactical mistake in not attacking the Mongols at the first opportunity. Instead, he sent a messenger to the Mongol side, Shimo Ming'an, who promptly defected and told the Mongols that the Jin army was waiting on the other side of the pass.
At this engagement, fought at Yehuling, the Mongols massacred thousands of Jin troops. The Mongols learnt at an early age to always fight on the move. They would pass through towns to draw their opponent away from their animals. When they fell for the Mongol army's trap, the Mongols would kill them and take their animals.
While Genghis Khan headed southward, his general Jebe travelled even further east into Manchuria and captured Mukden (present-day Shenyang). However, Genghis Khan was wounded by an arrow in his knee in 1212 after the Mongols returned from their relaxation in the borderlands between grass and the Gobi Desert. The Khitan leader Liu-ke had declared his allegiance to Genghis in 1212 and freed Manchuria from the Jin.
When the Mongol army besieged the Jin central capital, Zhongdu (present-day Beijing), in 1213, Li Ying, Li Xiong and a few other Jin generals assembled a militia of more than 10,000 men who inflicted several defeats on the Mongols.
The Mongols smashed the Jin armies, each numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and broke through Juyong Pass and Zijing Gap by November 1213. From 1213 until early 1214, the Mongols pillaged the entire North China plain. In 1214, Genghis Khan surrounded the court of the Golden Khan in Zhongdu. The Jin general Hushahu had murdered the emperor Wanyan Yongji and enthroned Wanyan Yongji's nephew, Emperor Xuanzong.
When the Mongols besieged Zhongdu, the Jin government temporarily agreed to become a tributary state of the Mongol Empire, presenting a Jurchen princess to Genghis Khan. But when the Mongols withdrew in 1214, believing the war was over after being given a large tribute by the Jurchens, Li Ying wanted to ambush them on the way with his forces (which had grown to several tens of thousands).
However, the Jin ruler, Emperor Aizong, was afraid of offending the Mongols again so he stopped Li Ying. Emperor Aizong and the general Zhuhu Gaoqi then decided to shift the capital south to Kaifeng, above the objections of many courtiers including Li Ying. From then on, the Jin were strictly on the defensive and Zhongdu fell to the Mongols in 1215.
After the shift of the Jin capital to Kaifeng, the Jin chancellor Wanyan Chenghui and general Moran Jinzhong were left to guard Zhongdu. At this point, one of the Jin armies defected to the Mongols and launched an attack on Zhongdu from the south, taking Lugou Bridge. Genghis Khan then dispatched his troops to attack Zhongdu again, led by the surrendered Khitan generals Shimo Ming'an, Yelü Ahai and Yelü Tuhua.
Moran Jinzhong's second-in-command, Pucha Qijin, surrendered to the Mongols with all the troops under him, throwing Zhongdu into crisis. Emperor Aizong then sent reinforcements north: Yongxi leading the troops from Zhending and Zhongshan (numbers not given), and Wugulun Qingshou leading 18,000 imperial guards, 11,000 infantry and cavalry from the southwestern route, and 10,000 soldiers from Hebei Province, with Li Ying in charge of the supply train. Zhongdu fell to the Mongols on May 31, 1215.
Then they systematically rooted out all resistance in Shanxi, Hebei and Shandong provinces from 1217-23. Genghis Khan then turned his attention to another event in Central Asia and Persia.
When Zhuhu Gaoqi was in control of the imperial court in 1217, he foolishly decided to invade the Han Chinese-led Southern Song dynasty in southern China for the first time in nearly 30 years. This war lasted until 1224 and was a total failure for the Jin dynasty. In 1224, Emperor Aizong declared that the Jin dynasty would never again invade the Song dynasty.
But the damage had already been done - the Jin forces had been split between north and south at a critical stage in the war with the Mongols when Zhongdu, Hebei and Shandong provinces had fallen and Shanxi Province was being attacked. Many Khitan mercenaries left the Jurchen armies and joined the Mongols.
Muqali's advance - In 1223, the Mongol general Muqali had struck into Shaanxi Province, attacking Chang'an when Genghis Khan was attacking Khwarezmia. The garrison in Chang'an, 200,000 under Wanyan Heda, was too strong and Muqali had to turn to besieging Feng County with 100,000 men.
The siege dragged on for months and the Mongols were harassed by local militia, while Jin reinforcements were about to arrive. Muqali then died of illness, and the Mongols retreated.
This was the siege in which the Western Xia troops supporting the Mongols gave up and went home, incurring the wrath of Genghis Khan. In the wars against the Mongols, therefore, the Jin relied heavily on subjects or allies like the Uighurs, Tanguts and Khitans to supply cavalry.
Han Chinese defectors - Many Han Chinese and Khitans defected to the Mongols to fight against the Jin dynasty. Two Han Chinese leaders, Shi Tianze and Liu Heima (劉黑馬), and the Khitan Xiao Zhala (蕭札剌) defected and commanded the three tumens in the Mongol army. Liu Heima and Shi Tianze served Genghis Khan's successor, Ögedei Khan.
Liu Heima and Shi Tianxiang led armies against Western Xia for the Mongols. There were four Han tumens and three Khitan tumens, with each tumen consisting of 10,000 troops.
The three Khitan generals Shimo Beidi'er (石抹孛迭兒), Tabuyir (塔不已兒), and Xiao Zhongxi (蕭重喜; Xiao Zhala's son) commanded the three Khitan tumens and the four Han generals Zhang Rou (張柔), Yan Shi (嚴實), Shi Tianze and Liu Heima commanded the four Han tumens under Ögedei Khan.
Shi Tianze, Zhang Rou, Yan Shi and other Han Chinese who served in the Jin dynasty and defected to the Mongols helped build the structure for the administration of the new Mongol state.
The Mongols valued physicians, craftsmen and religious clerics and ordered them to be spared from death and brought to them when cities were taken in northern China.
Mongol conquest under Ögedei Khan - When Ögedei Khan succeeded his father, he rebuffed Jin offers of peace talks. The Jin officers murdered Mongol envoys. The Kheshig commander Doqolqu was dispatched to attempt a frontal attack on Tong Pass, but Wanyan Heda defeated him and forced Subutai to withdraw in 1230.
In 1231, the Mongols attacked again and finally took Fengxiang. The Jin garrison in Chang'an panicked and abandoned the city, pulling back to Henan Province with all the city's population. One month later, the Mongols decided to use a three-pronged attack to converge on Kaifeng from north, east and west.
The western force under Tolui would start from Fengxiang, enter Tong Pass, and then pass through Song territory at the Han River (near Xiangyang) to reemerge south of Kaifeng to catch the Jurchens by surprise.
Wanyan Heda learned of this plan and led 200,000 men to intercept Tolui. At Dengzhou, he set an ambush in a valley with several tens of thousands of cavalry hidden behind the crest of either mountain, but Tolui's spies alerted him and he kept his main force with the supply train, sending only a smaller force of light cavalry to skirt around the valley and attack the Jin troops from behind.
Wanyan Heda saw that his plan had been foiled and prepared his troops for a Mongol assault. At Mount Yu, southwest of Dengzhou, the two armies met in a pitched battle. The Jin army had an advantage in numbers, and fought fiercely.
The Mongols then withdrew from Mount Yu by about 30 li, and Tolui changed his strategy. Leaving a part of his force to keep Wanyan Heda occupied, he sent most of his men to strike northwards at Kaifeng in several dispersed contingents to avoid alerting Heda.
On the way from Dengzhou to Kaifeng, the Mongols easily took county after county, and burnt all the supplies they captured so as to cut off Wanyan Heda's supply lines. Wanyan Heda was forced to withdraw, and ran into the Mongols at Three-peaked Hill in Junzhou.
At this point, the Jin troops on the Yellow River were also diverted southwards to meet Tolui's attack, and the Mongol northern force under Ögedei Khan seized this opportunity to cross the frozen river and join up with Tolui – even at this point, their combined strength was only about 50,000.
By 1232, the Jurchen ruler, Emperor Aizong, was besieged in Kaifeng. They together smashed the Jin forces. Ögedei Khan soon departed, leaving the final conquest to his generals.
The fall of the Jin dynasty - Wanyan Heda's army still had more than 100,000 men after the battle at Mount Yu, and the Mongols adopted a strategy of exhausting the enemy. The Jin troops had little rest all the way from Dengzhou, and had not eaten for three days because of the severing of their supply lines.
Their morale was plummeting and their commanders were losing confidence. When they reached Three-peaked Hill, a snowstorm suddenly broke out, and it was so cold that the faces of the Jin troops went as white as corpses, and they could hardly march.
Rather than attack them when they were desperate with their backs to the wall, the Mongols left them an escape route and then ambushed them when they let down their guard during the retreat. The Jin army collapsed without a fight, and the Mongols pursued the fleeing Jin troops relentlessly.
Wanyan Heda was killed, and most of his commanders also lost their lives. After the Battle of Three-peaked Hill, Kaifeng was doomed and Emperor Aizong soon abandoned the city and entered Hebei Province in a vain attempt to reestablish himself there.
Thousands of people offered a stubborn resistance to the Mongols, who entrusted the conduct of the attack to Subutai, the most daring of all their commanders. Emperor Aizong was driven south again, and by this time Kaifeng had been taken by the Mongols so he established his new capital at Caizhou (present-day Runan County, Henan Province).
Subutai wished to massacre the whole of the population. But Yelü Chucai was more humane, and under his advice Ögedei Khan rejected the cruel proposal.
The Jurchens used fire arrows against the Mongols during the defence of Kaifeng in 1232. The Mongols adopted this weapon in later conquests. In 1233, after Emperor Aizong had abandoned Kaifeng and failed to raise a new army for himself in Hebei, he returned to Henan and established his base in Guide (present-day Anyang).
Scattered Jin armies began to gather at Guide from the surrounding region and Hebei, and the supplies in the city could no longer feed all these soldiers. Thus Emperor Aizong was left with only 450 Han Chinese troops under the command of Pucha Guannu and 280 men under Ma Yong to guard the city, and dispersed the rest of the troops to forage in Su (in Anhui Province), Xu (present-day Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province), and Chen (present-day Huaiyang, Henan Province).
Pucha Guannu then launched a coup with his troops, killing Ma Yong and more than 300 other courtiers, as well as about 3,000 officers, palace guards and civilians who refused to cooperate with him. He made Emperor Aizong a puppet ruler and became the real master of the Jin imperial court. At this point the Mongols had arrived outside Guide and were preparing to besiege the city. The Mongol general Sajisibuhua had set up camp north of the city, on the bank of a river.
Guannu then led his 450 troops out on boats from the southern gate at night, armed with fire-lances. They rowed along the river by the eastern side of the city, reaching the Mongol camp early in the morning. Emperor Aizong watched the battle from the northern gate of the city, with his imperial boat prepared for him to flee to Xuzhou if the Jin troops were defeated.
The Jin troops assaulted the Mongol camp from two directions, using their fire-lances to throw the Mongols into a panic. More than 3,500 Mongols drowned in the river while trying to flee, and the Mongol stockades were all burned to the ground. Sajisibuhua was also killed in the battle. Pucha Guannu had achieved a remarkable victory and was promoted by Emperor Aizong.
But Guide was not defensible in the long term, and the other courtiers urged Emperor Aizong to move to Caizhou, which had stronger walls and more provisions and troops. Pucha Guannu opposed the move, afraid that his power base would be weakened and arguing that Caizhou's advantages had been overstated.
The Han Chinese general Shi Tianze led troops to pursue Emperor Aizong as he retreated, and destroyed an 80,000-strong Jin army led by Wanyan Chengyi (完顏承裔) at Pucheng (蒲城).
Three months later, Emperor Aizong used a plot to assassinate Guannu, and then quickly began preparations to move to Caizhou. By the time new reports reached him that Caizhou was still too weak in defences, troops and supplies, he was already on the way there. The fate of the Jin dynasty was then sealed for good, despite the earlier victory against great odds at Guide.
The Southern Song dynasty, wishing to give the Jin dynasty the coup de grâce, declared war upon the Jurchens, and placed a large army in the field. The remainder of the Jin army took shelter in Caizhou, where they were closely besieged by the Mongols on one side and the Song army on the other.
Driven thus into a corner, the Jurchens fought with the courage of despair and long held out against the combined efforts of their enemies. At last, Emperor Aizong saw that the struggle could not be prolonged, and he prepared himself to end his life. When the enemy breached the city walls, Emperor Aizong committed suicide after passing the throne to his general Wanyan Chenglin. Wanyan Chenglin, historically known as Emperor Mo, ruled for less than a day before he was finally killed in battle. Thus the Jin dynasty came to an end in the year 1234.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_conquest_of_the_Jin_dynasty
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The naval Battle of Yamen (simplified Chinese: 崖门战役; traditional Chinese: 厓門戰役) (also known as the Naval Battle of Mount Ya; simplified Chinese: 崖山海战; traditional Chinese: 厓山海戰) took place on 19 March 1279 and is considered to be the last stand of the Song dynasty against the invading Mongol Yuan dynasty. Although outnumbered 10:1, the Yuan navy delivered a crushing tactical and strategic victory, destroying the Song.
In 1276, the Southern Song court, in their rush to flee the capital city of Lin'an to avoid Mongol invaders approaching Fuzhou, left Emperor Gong behind to be captured. Hopes of resistance centered on two young princes, Gong's brothers.
The older boy, Zhao Shi, who was nine years old, was declared emperor.[clarification needed] In 1277, when Fuzhou fell to the Mongols, the exiled dynasty fled to Quanzhou, where Zhang Shijie, the Grand General of Song, hoped to borrow boats to continue their flight. However, the Muslim merchant Fu Shougeng refused their request, prompting Zhang to confiscate Fu's properties and flee on stolen boats with the Song court.
In fury, Fu slaughtered the imperial clan and many officials in Quanzhou and surrendered to the Yuan, strengthening the Mongols' naval power. At this point of the war it was obvious that the Song did not have sufficient strength to risk fighting the Yuan in a head-on conflict. Zhang Shijie decided to build a vast fleet with what remained, to allow the Song court and soldiers to move from place to place until the situation improved.
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The Song court sailed to Guangdong from Quanzhou. However, Zhao Shi's boat capsized in a storm on the way to Leizhou. Although he survived, he fell ill because of this ordeal. The imperial court later sought refuge in Lantau Island's Mui Wo, where Emperor Zhao Shi eventually died[citation needed]; he was succeeded by his younger sibling, Zhao Bing (under a temple name Emperor Huaizong, unofficially), who was seven. Zhang Shijie brought the new emperor to Yamen and prepared the defense against the Yuan there.
In 1278 Wen Tianxiang, who had fought against the Yuan in Guangdong and Jiangxi, was captured by Wang Weiyi in Haifeng County, eliminating all the Song land forces nearby.
In 1279 Zhang Hongfan of the Yuan attacked the Song navy in Yamen. Li Heng, who previously had captured Guangzhou, reinforced Zhang Hongfan. Some within the Song forces suggested that the navy should first claim the mouth of the bay, to secure their line of retreat to the west. Zhang Shijie turned down this suggestion in order to prevent his soldiers from fleeing the battle. He then ordered the burning of all palaces, houses and forts on land for the same reason.
Zhang Shijie ordered about 1,000 ships to be chained together, forming a long string within the bay, and placed Zhao Bing's boat in the center of his fleet. This was done to prevent individual Song ships from fleeing the battle.
The Yuan forces steered fire ships into the Song formation, but the Song ships were prepared for such an attack: all Song ships had been painted with fire-resistant mud. The Yuan navy then blockaded the bay, while the Yuan army cut off the Song's fresh water and wood sources on land. The Song side, with many non-combatants, soon ran out of supplies.
The Song soldiers were forced to eat dry foods and drink sea water, causing nausea and vomiting. Zhang Hongfan even kidnapped Zhang Shijie's nephew, asking Zhang Shijie to surrender on three occasions, to no avail.
In the afternoon of 18 March Zhang Hongfan prepared for a massive assault. The employment of cannons was turned down because Hongfan felt that cannons could break the chains of the formation too effectively, making it easy for the Song ships to retreat. The next day Zhang Hongfan split his naval forces into four parts: one each for the Song's east, north, and south sides, while Hongfan led the remaining portion to about a li away from the Song forces.
First, the north flank engaged the Song forces but were repulsed. The Yuan then began playing festive music, leading the Song to think that the Yuan forces were having a banquet and lowering their guard. At noon Zhang Hongfan attacked from the front, hiding additional soldiers under large pieces of cloth. Once Zhang Hongfan's boats neared the Song fleet, the Yuan sounded the horn of battle, revealing the soldiers under the fabric.
The Song troops were prepared for a small skirmish, not a large assault. Waves of arrows hit the Song ships. Caught off guard, the Song fleet immediately lost seven ships, along with a great number of troops in the process. The ill and weakened Song soldiers were no match for the Yuan troops in close combat, and the chaotic environment made battle command impossible. The chained Song ships could neither support the middle nor retreat.
After the Song troops were killed, the bloody slaughter of the Song court began. Seeing that the battle was lost, Zhang Shijie picked out his finest soldiers and cut about a dozen ships from the formation in an attempted breakout to save the emperor.
The Yuan forces quickly advanced to the center and to Zhao Bing, killing everyone in their way. There, Prime Minister Lu Xiufu saw no hope of breaking free and, taking the boy emperor with him, jumped into the sea, where both drowned. Many officials and concubines followed suit.
The History of Song records that, seven days after the battle, hundreds of thousands of corpses floated to the surface of the sea. Reportedly, the body of the boy emperor was found near today's Shekou in Shenzhen, though his actual grave has yet to be found.
Zhang Shijie, having escaped the battle, hoped to have Dowager Yang appoint the next Song emperor, and from there continue to resist the Yuan dynasty. However, after hearing of Emperor Huaizong's death, Dowager Yang also committed suicide at sea. Zhang Shijie buried her at the shore.
He and his remaining soldiers were assumed to have drowned at sea, as a tropical storm whipped up soon afterwards. However, there have been suggestions that his death was simply Mongolian propaganda, since no remains or trace of his fleet were ever found.
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As Zhao Bing was the last Song emperor, his death effectively ended the Song dynasty, leaving the Yuan dynasty, under Kublai Khan, with all of China under its control.
A rock was carved in memory of Zhang Hongfan there. Many temples were built in the surrounding area in memory of those who lost their lives in the dying years of the Song dynasty, including Wen Tianxiang, Lu Xiufu and Zhang Shijie. In the 1980s another memorial was built near Shekou to commemorate Zhao BIng. The preparation of a soup dish, patriotic soup, has also become a way to monumentalize the boy emperor by the Teochew people.
Kublai Khan and his successors and followers would rule China for 97 years until the rise of the Ming dynasty under the Hongwu Emperor, when the Chinese regained control of their lost territory from the Mongols.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Yamen
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After the collapse of the Tang Empire in 907 AD, China plunged into an era of darkness. The mighty realm of the Tang fragmented into many different kingdoms and warlords vying for power. This period of Chinese history is called the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period.
In the north arose the five dynasties, all of whom tried but were unsuccessful at unifying China. They were the Later Liang(907 - 923), the Later Tang(923 - 936), the Later Jin(936 - 946), the Later Han(947 - 950)and the later Zhou(950 - 960).
In the south arose the Ten Kingdoms, which coexisted and warred with each other constantly. They were: Wu(902 - 937), Former Shu(907 - 925), Wu Yue(908 - 978), Min(909 - 946), South Tang(937 - 975), Chu(927 - 951), South Han(917 - 971), Nan Ping(925 - 963), Later Shu(934 - 965)and North Han(951 - 979). This period of warfare devastated China, resulting in great drops of population.
In 960, General Zhao Kuangyin, serving in the army of the Later Zhou Dynasty, was elected emperor by his disgruntled soldiers. In fact, he was dragged from his bed in the middle of the night and had the emperor's dragon robe thrown on him hastily! He marched on the capital and deposed the last emperor of Later Zhou, establishing the Sung Dynasty. He took the title Taizu.
Sung Taizu built a centralized and efficient civilian bureaucracy, which curtailed the power of the military that had led in part to the fall of the Tang. In the field, his armies destroyed the southern states one by one, slowly unifying the south. The last to fall were South Tang and North Han, in the reign of Taizu's young brother, Taizong.
Sung Taizu died in 976 AD, having set the stage for a strong empire. He was succeeded by his brother, Taizong, who consolidated his brother's gains and finally unified all of China for the Sung. He rebuilt China, restoring devastated lands to agricultural production and setting the army to work rebuilding the country's infrasturcture. China began to grow strong again, and the population increased and the economy recovered.
However the military was never as strong as it was in previous dynasties, and Sung armies frequently lost in confrontations with Liao to the west.
The later Northern Sung era saw a flowering of the arts, as famous poets and artists like Su Dongpo and Wang Anshi himself left behind great pieces for the world to admire. Culture reached and surpassed the level reached by the Tang, with new styles of pottery and drawing.
Wang Anshi became prime minister in 1069. He instituted reforms designed to help the common people, including land reforms, but these were opposed by the upper classes, who forced his resignation in 1076. A period of relative peace and prosperity followed.
Gunpowder was used in war for the first time, usually only to frighten the horses of the enemy, and an accurate mechanical clock was said to have been built in Kaifeng. In the early years of the 12th century, however, a new menace appeared on the scene: the Jin Dynasty.
The Jurchen people of the north had moved south and displaced the Liao kingdom on China's southern borders by 1115. The Sung were no match for the mighty Manchurian horsemen, and made an alliance against mutual enemies instead. However, the Jin turned on the Sung soon after, and had taken most of northern China by the 1120s.
In 1126 they took Kaifeng and the two emperors We Zong and Qin Zong prisoners. A member of the royal family fled south with the Sung court and founded a new dynasty at Nanjing, declaring himself Emperor Gao Zong.
Throughout the 1130s, the Sung, led by the able general Yue Fei, waged war on the Jin, winning many crushing victories. Just as Yue Fei was on the verge of retaking Kaifeng, he was called back to Nanjing, arrested, and together with his son, Yue Yun, executed in 1141.
This was all the doing of the traitor, Qin Hui, who persuaded Gao Zong of the advantages of signing a peace treaty instead of making war. Qin Hui is still much hated in China today for what he did to a noble and valiant patriot.
The "Southern Sung", however, flourished even without its northern territories. There were even greater technological and cultural advancements, and the population increased greatly, although the Sung remained militarily weak. But now an even more ominous force loomed: the Mongols.
After being unified under Genghis Khan in 1206, they invaded north China, the Jin empire. The Sung, instead of allying with the Jin against a more dangerous enemy, took the chance to ally with the Mongols instead, and Sung and Mongol troops put an end to the Jin Dynasty in 1234 AD. Next the Mongols wiped out the Tanguts, then turned on Sung.
The war was long and bloody as the Sung fought bitterly, but Kublai Khan had defeated the last major Sung armies and reduced the last pockets of resistance by 1279. Despite valiant resistance by patriots like Wen Tianxiang, the 270-year-old Sung Dynasty had fallen.
The Sung Dynasty contributed much to China's culture and literature. Sung paintings and verses are still studied and admired in China and throughout the world. Great leaps were also made in the field of technology The main weakness of the Sung was their military, and this and the usual mix of corrupt officials and weak emperors contributed to their downfall.
http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=The_Song_Dynasty
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The Vietnamese feudal Trần dynasty, governing the country Đại Việt, employed several military tactics that enabled them to defeat the Mongol Empire against the Mongol invasion. The first war between two sides occurred in 1258. The second collision happened in 1285, when the Mongols planned to invade Vietnam and annex the country into their Yuan dynasty, with 500,000 soldiers and supporting troops.
The third and final war was in 1288, when the Yuan dynasty came to Vietnam with a 300,000-personnel navy force. Upon the establishment of peace between the two dynasties, monarchs of Đại Việt maintained a tributary relationship to the Yuan dynasty thereafter to preserve their independence.
Cấm quân is force guarding for Thăng Long, capital of Đại Việt. Lộ quân is force protecting "Lộ" (administrative division in Trần dynasty period). Every "Lộ" have 1 Quân and 20 support units call "Phong đoàn", about 120 soldiers.
At peace time, Trần royal navy force included: Đông Hải Quân, that's a "Quân" (~ 2.400 soldiers), fights on rivers, sea, and along beaches.
Bình Hải Quân, that's a "Quân" and supporting by 900 sailors, they had 30 sailboats, fights on sea, islands, mouth of rivers. Headquarters at Vân Đồn island.
The total number of Trần navy's battleships is not known, but there are notes in battle of Vạn Kiếp (begin: 11 February 1285), Vietnamese used 1,000 small sailboats of the type used on rivers.
Sương quân: is the army of the rich families or the sovereign but not of the Trần royal. Vương hầu quân: recruited by royal nobles, trained and equipped themselves. According to law of royal, there could have about 1,000 of them.
Their force rather important in war when Mongol invade to Đại Việt. An important military policy of Trần dynasty calls "Ngụ binh ư nông". When the nation is in peacetime, royal not to needs more soldiers. A part of military maintaining during fulltime. And, almost every man of military-age can do farming at their farm. Needs to change to serve the military's cycle, that's part time. When the nation under invasion, the emperor will want them all.
In 1284, Trần dynasty forces had 200.000 soldiers before Mongols came to Đại Việt. Vietnamese was ready to war. When Đại Việt under attack by Mongol, all peoples joins to war, solidarity and psychological self-defense as ascendant of Vietnamese. They understand our country being under a invade war. Vietnamese'slogan: "Cử quốc nghênh địch" (meaning: All country face to face enemy).
At Diên Hồng conference, when Đại Việt emperor talk about: "Should we surrender or fight ?", all Trần royal's member, military commander, oldman leaders make high screaming: "Fight!". Trần dynasty soldier make a tattoo two words on their hand: "Sát Thát" (meaning: Fight Mongolian).
Scorched earth - Thăng Long capital of Đại Việt collapsed every time Mongolian come, but they do not know Vietnamese prepared psychological to leave Thăng Long in soon. Because, early time, Vietnamese understood they could not protect.
Scorched earth strategy, Vietnamese carry what they needed and could, and destroy everything they can not bring to, so Mongolian troops can not used anything. This strategy, Vietnamese calls: "Vườn không nhà trống" (meaning: Both garden and house are empty)
Longdays war - The favorite feature of the Vietnamese is to prolong the time of the war, making the enemy bogged down. The Mongolian army was fall in the rainy season and they begin infected with tropical diseases. Extend the time to deplete the enemy's war resources. Vietnamese have slogan: "Lấy sức nhàn thắng sức mỏi" (meaning: our's troops with good healthy hit enemy troops tired).
Alliance - Đại Việt created an alliance with Champa. Champa people understand if Đại Việt falls, they're will be face to face Mongol alone. So that Champa people helps Vietnamese, about 60.000 troops sent to Đại Việt. And, when Mongol navy force make a amphibious warfare campaign, invade Champa and ready for a pincer movement campaign attack to Đại Việt from the south. War at Champa destroy many army's divide of Mongol, make them lost almost ability of military for campaign.
Invade war of Mongol doesn't surprise for Vietnamese. They're preparing in long time before enemy come. And after even time of war, they know the enemy will be coming back. They prepared army force, food,...
Commander Trần Hưng Đạo was said to his troops: "Mongolian troop higher and stronger than you, how can you defeated him when you do not fight exercise". Trần dynasty's army exercised every day during the time before war burn. Tactics - Used advantage of terrain, hit and run, ambush - Đại Việt army did not stop the Mongols from the beginning of the war, but let Mongol army moving deep into Đại Việt territory.
They make use of the understanding of their territory, the advantages of terrain. Build secret bases to hide and ambush points when they fighting. Take this advantage, Vietnamese attack and defense very flexible. Not only did the Mongols used hit and run tactic, Vietnamese were even more proficient this tactic as a art. When they could not win, they retreat quickly.
In navy battle, Vietnamese used tactic hit and run, allure Mongol battleship moving to ambush place on Bạch Đằng river, and defeated them.
Attack enemy logistics - Vietnamese continuing to attack the enemy's military logistics. They're understand with a huge numbers of army which 500,000 man (soldiers and supportmans) Mongol wanna huge logistics. They're repeatedly attacked Mongol's supply lines.
When they can not succeed, they choose the other times to attack the Mongol reserve treasures. With that things, when the logistics decline, Mongolian with large troops numbers will be exhausted.
In third time Mongol invade Đại Việt, they used 70 transport ships, movement 170.000 koku food. Vietnamese guess thats thing at soon time, that Mongol will find way to war without logistics problem of them. Vietnamese army and navy waiting Mongol come, and a navy battle was happened, almost transport ships sunk, fastly Mongol ready a plan to run away out of Đại Việt. They knows they can not fights without food.
Disperse and converging - Trần dynasty's army disperse their force units in beginning war and when they meet a large force of Mongol. When meeting advantages time, they converging their armys for battles. This tactic similar basic tactic of Mongol.
But, when Mongol converging their force, Vietnamese never attack, in Vietnam military phrase that calls "Bảo toàn lực lượng" and "Án binh bất động". When, they saw Mongol disperse force, they will be attack, defeat in detail Mongol force.
Psychological warfare - Launched a psychological warfare aimed to Chinese troops in the Mongol army. Because, just only a part of expeditionaries are Mongolian, almost them are Chinese, Vietnamese calling them to leave the Mongol army.
With a slave army, Mongol not strenghs. Trầns'force make night combat tactic. They make enemy troops did tired, which longdays war it's make Mongol force to depressed.
Vietnamese make a counter-offensive at righttime when Mongol army tired. That's true time Vietnamese have a total war to defeated invade force.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%E1%BA%A7n_dynasty_military_tactics_and_organization
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Việt Nam (About this soundlisten) is a variation of Nam Việt (Southern Việt), a name that can be traced back to the Triệu dynasty (2nd century BC, also known as Nanyue Kingdom).
The word "Việt" originated as a shortened form of Bách Việt, a word used to refer to a people who lived in what is now southern China in ancient times. The word "Việt Nam", with the syllables in the modern order, first appears in the 16th century in a poem by Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm. "Annam", which originated as a Chinese name in the seventh century, was the common name of the country during the colonial period.
Nationalist writer Phan Bội Châu revived the name "Vietnam" in the early 20th century. When rival communist and anti-communist governments were set up in 1945, both immediately adopted this as the country's official name. In English, the two syllables are usually combined into one word, "Vietnam." However, "Viet Nam" was once common usage and is still used by the United Nations and by the Vietnamese government.
Throughout history, there were many names used to refer to Vietnam. Besides official names, there are names that are used unofficially to refer to territory of Vietnam. Vietnam was called Văn Lang during the Hùng Vương Dynasty, Âu Lạc when An Dương was king, Nam Việt during the Triệu Dynasty, Van Xuan during the Anterior Lý Dynasty, Đại Cồ Việt during the Đinh dynasty and Early Lê dynasty. Starting in 1054, Vietnam was called Đại Việt (Great Viet). During the Hồ dynasty, Vietnam was called Đại Ngu.
The term "Việt" (Yue) (Chinese: 越; pinyin: Yuè; Cantonese Yale: Yuht; Wade–Giles: Yüeh4; Vietnamese: Việt), Early Middle Chinese was first written using the logograph "戉" for an axe (a homophone), in oracle bone and bronze inscriptions of the late Shang dynasty (c. 1200 BC), and later as "越".
At that time it referred to a people or chieftain to the northwest of the Shang. In the early 8th century BC, a tribe on the middle Yangtze were called the Yangyue, a term later used for peoples further south. Between the 7th and 4th centuries BC Yue/Việt referred to the State of Yue in the lower Yangtze basin and its people.
From the 3rd century BC the term was used for the non-Chinese populations of south and southwest China and northern Vietnam, with particular states or groups called Minyue, Ouyue, Luoyue (Vietnamese: Lạc Việt), etc., collectively called the Baiyue (Bách Việt, Chinese: 百越; pinyin: Bǎiyuè; Cantonese Yale: Baak Yuet; Vietnamese: Bách Việt; "Hundred Yue/Viet"; ). The term Baiyue/Bách Việt first appeared in the book Lüshi Chunqiu compiled around 239 BC.
In 207 BC, former Qin dynasty general Zhao Tuo/Triệu Đà founded the kingdom Nanyue/Nam Việt (Chinese: 南越; "Southern Yue/Việt") with its capital at Panyu (modern Guangzhou).
This kingdom was "southern" in the sense that it was located south of other Baiyue kingdoms such as Minyue and Ouyue, located in modern Fujian and Zhejiang. Several later Vietnamese dynasties followed this nomenclature even after these more northern peoples were absorbed into China.
In "Sấm Trạng Trình" (The Prophecies of Trạng Trình), poet Nguyen Binh Khiêm (1491–1585) reversed the traditional order of the syllables and put the name in its modern form: "Vietnam is being created" (Việt Nam khởi tổ xây nền). At this time, the country was divided between the Trịnh lords of Hanoi and the Nguyễn lords of Huế.
By combining several existing names, Nam Việt, Annam (Pacified South), Đại Việt (Great Việt), and "Nam quốc" (southern nation), Khiêm could create a new name that referred to an aspirational unified state. The word "nam" no longer implies Southern Việt, but rather that Vietnam is "the South" in contrast to China, "the North".
This explanation is implied by Lý Thường Kiệt in the poem "Nam quốc sơn hà" (1077): "Over the mountains and rivers of the South, reigns the emperor of the South." Researcher Nguyễn Phúc Giác Hải found the word 越南 "Việt Nam" on 12 steles carved in the 16th and 17th centuries, including one at Bảo Lâm Pagoda, Haiphong (1558).
Nguyễn Phúc Chu (1675–1725) used the word in a poem: "This is the most dangerous mountain in Vietnam" (Việt Nam hiểm ải thử sơn điên). It was used as an official name by Emperor Gia Long in 1804-1813. The Jiaqing Emperor refused Gia Long's request to change his country's name to Nam Việt, and changed the name instead to Việt Nam. Gia Long's Đại Nam thực lục contains the diplomatic correspondence over the naming.
"Trung Quốc" 中國 or the 'Middle Country' was used as a name for Vietnam by Gia Long in 1805. Minh Mang used the name "Trung Quốc" 中國 to call Vietnam. Vietnamese Nguyen Emperor Minh Mạng sinicized ethnic minorities such as Cambodians, claimed the legacy of Confucianism and China's Han dynasty for Vietnam, and used the term Han people 漢人 to refer to the Vietnamese.
Minh Mang declared that "We must hope that their barbarian habits will be subconsciously dissipated, and that they will daily become more infected by Han [Sino-Vietnamese] customs." This policies were directed at the Khmer and hill tribes. The Nguyen lord Nguyen Phuc Chu had referred to Vietnamese as "Han people" in 1712 when differentiating between Vietnamese and Chams. Chinese clothing was forced on Vietnamese people by the Nguyen.
The use of "Vietnam" was revived in modern times by nationalists including Phan Bội Châu, whose book Việt Nam vong quốc sử (History of the Loss of Vietnam) was published in 1906. Chau also founded the Việt Nam Quang Phục Hội (Vietnam Restoration League) in 1912.
However, the general public continued to use Annam and the name "Vietnam" remained virtually unknown until the Yên Bái mutiny of 1930, organized by the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party).
By the early 1940s, the use of "Việt Nam" was widespread. It appeared in the name of Ho Chi Minh's Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Viet Minh), founded 1941, and was even used by the governor of French Indochina in 1942. The name "Vietnam" has been official since 1945. It was adopted in June by Bảo Đại's imperial government in Huế, and in September by Ho's rival communist government in Hanoi.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_of_Vietnam
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Thi hài thật vua Quang Trung được táng ở đâu? Huế, Bình Định, Hà Nội, Nghệ An hay một nơi bí mật nào đó trên dải đất hình chữ S vẫn là câu hỏi lớn. Có giả thuyết cho rằng sau khi qua đời, thi hài vua Quang Trung đã được bí mật đưa về an táng tại quê cha đất tổ ở thành Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô thuộc phường Trung Đô, TP Vinh, tỉnh Nghệ An.
Theo các tài liệu lịch sử, vua Quang Trung (Nguyễn Huệ) sinh ra và lớn lên ở Tây Sơn, Bình Định nhưng quê gốc ở Nghệ An. Năm 1788, vua cho xây dựng kinh đô tại vùng đất giữa núi Phượng Hoàng và núi Kỳ Lân ở Yên Trường, Châu Lộc, Nghệ An, nay là phường Trung Đô, TP Vinh.
Thành Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô đang xây dựng dang dở thì mùa thu năm 1792, vua bất ngờ lâm trọng bệnh qua đời. Trước khi băng hà, vua đã căn dặn con trai Quang Toản: "Nghệ An là đất của cha mẹ ta, đất ấy là nơi hiểm yếu có thể tin cậy được. Ta đắp thành dày để làm Trung Đô. Nếu có biến cố còn có thể giữ được…".
Sau khi vua băng hà, triều đại Tây Sơn kéo dài thêm 10 năm thì sụp đổ. Nhà Nguyễn lên ngôi, thành Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô bị rơi vào quên lãng. Sau hơn 200 năm, thành Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô chỉ còn lại một ít dấu tích nhạt nhòa ở phường Trung Đô.
Theo GS-TS Nguyễn Quang Ngọc (Hội Khoa học Lịch sử Việt Nam), Quang Trung là người rất tin chuyện mồ mả, khi tấn công vào Phú Xuân, ông đã từng cho quật mộ tổ tông của chúa Nguyễn. Trước khi về cõi vĩnh hằng, ông dự cảm nếu không duy trì được vương triều, nếu để nhà Nguyễn thắng thế, có lúc mộ của ông sẽ bị quật lên.
Đúng như ông tiên đoán, sau này, Nguyễn Ánh đã quật tất cả mộ của nhà Tây Sơn... Như thế, Quang Trung hoàn toàn không muốn nằm lại Phú Xuân và di nguyện tuyệt đối giữ bí mật lăng mộ và thi hài của mình.
Thực tế Quang Trung đã từng truyền cho xã Thái Lão (huyện Hưng Nguyên) xây dựng tổ miếu của nhà vua để thờ cúng. Điều này có nghĩa là đồng thời với việc xây dựng kinh đô, Quang Trung đã quan tâm đến việc xây dựng mồ mả tổ tiên và lăng mộ của vương triều trên quê gốc Nghệ An.
GS-TS Nguyễn Quang Ngọc nhận định nếu thi hài vua Quang Trung đã được đưa ra khỏi Phú Xuân thì chỉ có Nghệ An vừa là quê cha đất tổ vừa là kinh đô của vương triều, thế đất hiểm yếu, có thể khống chế thiên hạ, đủ yên tâm cho hoàng đế yên giấc ngàn thu.
Ông Nguyễn Hữu Bản - nguyên Bí thư Thành ủy TP Vinh, trưởng nhóm tìm kiếm lăng mộ hoàng đế Quang Trung tại Nghệ An - cho biết: "Quang Trung có rất nhiều kẻ thù cả bên trong lẫn bên ngoài như: Thanh, Xiêm, Lê, Trịnh, Nguyễn...
Trong đó, tử thù là Nguyễn Ánh đang ngày càng mạnh lên, khả năng sẽ chiếm được thành Phú Xuân. Quang Trung đã nhìn thấy điều đó khi dặn con và cận thần phải chuyển kinh đô ra Nghệ An, không có lý gì mà ông lại chịu yên giấc tại Phú Xuân để sau này Nguyễn Ánh có thể quật mồ lên trả thù một cách dễ dàng".
Theo nhiều tài liệu lịch sử, sau khi Quang Trung qua đời, khoảng 2-3 tháng mới tổ chức phát tang. Thời gian này, thành Phú Xuân "nội bất xuất, ngoại bất nhập". Đường biển, đường bộ đều được canh gác, kiểm soát nghiêm ngặt.
Đây chính là thời gian để các cận thần thân thích làm mộ giả và an táng Quang Trung giả tại thành Phú Xuân. Thi hài an táng tại Huế có thể là "giả vương nhập cận" Phạm Công Trị hay một cận thần nào đó. Cũng trong thời gian này, thi hài thật của Quang Trung đã được bí mật vận chuyển theo đường thủy ra Cửa Hội rồi ngược theo sông Lam đem vào an táng tại lăng mộ đã xây dựng sẵn ở thành Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô.
Vào năm 2012, tỉnh Nghệ An đã mời các chuyên gia từ ĐHQG Hà Nội mang một máy dò địa vật lý từng tham gia khai quật tại Hoàng thành Thăng Long vào khảo sát. "Khi đưa máy vào thăm dò, đến khu vực nghi có mộ vua Quang Trung, máy đều bị tê liệt.
Sau khi nhờ người gốc họ Hồ thắp hương xin, máy mới hoạt động trở lại. Qua thăm dò ở khu vực sau bia dẫn tích, máy có phát hiện một vật khác thường nằm ở độ sâu từ 6- 6,5 m" - ông Bản nói.
Tiếp tục khảo cổ lần 2 tại Huế - Trong khi đó, cuộc thăm dò khảo cổ để tìm lăng mộ vua Quang Trung vẫn đang tiếp tục tại Thừa Thiên - Huế với nhiều bước tiến đáng ghi nhận. Vào tháng 1 -2017, Viện Khảo cổ học thuộc Viện Hàn lâm khoa học xã hội Việt Nam phối hợp với Sở Văn hóa - Thể thao tỉnh Thừa Thiên - Huế đã công bố kết quả thăm dò khảo cổ học gò Dương Xuân tại phường Trường An, TP Huế.
Nhà nghiên cứu Nguyễn Đắc Xuân cho rằng nơi đây là cung điện Đan Dương mà vua Quang Trung ở trong khi chờ đợi xây dựng Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô, sau đó biến thành lăng Đan Dương khi vị vua này mất.
Tại lần thăm dò này mở 5 hố thám sát, trong đó có vị trí ở chùa Thiền Lâm tọa lạc trên đường Điện Biên Phủ, phường Trường An, TP Huế. Kết quả đã phát hiện được nhiều hiện vật như mảnh sành sứ, gạch ngói… bước đầu xác định có niên đại từ thế kỷ XVII đến XIX, kéo dài qua thế kỷ XX. Việc thăm dò cung cấp thêm tư liệu về thời kỳ Tây Sơn liên quan đến thành quách, cung điện.
Mới đây, Bộ Văn hóa - Thể thao và Du lịch đã đồng ý chủ trương mở rộng khai quật khảo cổ học gò Dương Xuân với diện tích dự kiến 300 m2. Ông Cao Huy Hùng, Giám đốc Bảo tàng Lịch sử cách mạng tỉnh Thừa Thiên - Huế, cho hay đang phối hợp với Viện Khảo cổ học để làm phương án khảo cổ.
"Việc khảo cổ mở rộng lần này phải giải phóng mặt bằng, đền bù giải tỏa. Khu vực này tập trung đông dân cư nên kinh phí đền bù giải tỏa, tái định cư khá nhiều" - ông Hùng nói.
Dự kiến điểm khai quật chính là mở rộng với diện tích 200 m2 đối với hố thăm dò số 5 ở một nhà dân, nơi đã phát hiện một bức tường đá hồi tháng 10-2016.
Từ hố khai quật số 5 này sẽ mở rộng khai quật theo hướng chùa Thiền Lâm với khoảng cách 50 m. Ngoài ra sẽ khai quật thêm 4 khu vực gồm cồn Bông Sứ, giếng loạn, khu vực mộ trước chùa Vạn Phước, hồ bán nguyệt.
Ông Hoàng Ngọc Khanh, Chánh Văn phòng UBND tỉnh, cho biết đang chờ ngành khảo cổ gửi phương án mở rộng thăm dò để có căn cứ giải phóng mặt bằng.
https://baomoi.com/vua-quang-trung-da-co-du-cam-se-bi-nha-nguyen-tra- thu/c/25132426.epi
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