Rainbow Cal Silica is said to be from Chihuahua, Mexico.

 http://www.angelfire.com/pa5/joshuabrody2005/rainbowcalsilica.html
...

Crawford understood the role of the Phantom correctly. In his voice there is a lonely coldness and a fatherly warmth. He moves oddly, just like a seriously deformed man would because of his deformity and because he has never been around ordinary people.

His acting holds within the rage the Phantom feels towards humanity for the discrimination he has faced, and he also shows the passion for his music and Christine in his emotions. I think all modern Phantoms fail to understand the character. They move sexually, sing in a very trained and classic way and act like some mean bad boys.

The Phantom is supposed to be middle-aged, deformed and lonely as hell, he has become a ghostly man not truly understanding how one should love another. He should be an insecure artist driven mad by discrimination and the lack of company and love (which is caused by his deformity). There is no sex appeal in this man, he is a PHANTOM, a ghost!

In the book he is described as a skeletal corpse and the only kind of connection Christine shares with him is that of a tutor and a pupil (and there is of course the link to her father).

 

He is supposed to be creepy, ugly, lonely and mad. I can understand why some people (young women) would be more drawn towards a hot young guy in a mask (because that's mysterious and sexy), but the true Phantom is not like that.

The true Phantom's story is all about discrimination, how people are sick to only care about how others look like and how some of us have to suffer because of that.

 

It's not a love triangle where a girl has to choose between two sexy guys, it is a story of how a man has to live alone because of others and learn how to love correctly (by giving freedom to the only love of his life instead of keeping her as his slave forever). Crawford understood that and the character. That is why he is easily my favorite Phantom.

          

In China, women had different kinds of clothes in ancient times. Those clothes changed with the revolution of dynasties. For examples, in the 1920s, the Cheongsam was fashionable among socialites and upperclass women; during the 1960s, very austere clothes styles were prevalent; today, a wide variety of fashions are worn. Different provinces and regions of China also have different clothing styles.

In Qin and Han dynasties, women usually wore loose clothes with long large sleeves. Under the long skirt was a pair of high-heeled clogs with some embroidery on them. There was usually a scarf called Jinguo (巾帼) wrapped on the arm of a noble woman while ordinary or poor women had no decoration on their arms.

 

As time passed by, the coat tended to be shorter and the skirt became longer. Noble women even needed maids’ help to lift up the skirts to avoid the skirts being stained by the ground.

 

In Sui and Tang dynasties, women’s clothes had the trend to be more open. Small-sleeves coats usually made of yarn, still long skirts, wide and long scarves were what they often wore.
 

They could bare the part of body above their chests. This sort of cloth could show the beauty of women better. Another kind of clothes popular that time was something with big sleeves, short breasted shirts and long light skirts.

The attire of women during the Song dynasty (960 - 1279) was distinguished from men's clothing by being fastened on the left, not on the right. Women wore long dresses or blouses that came down almost to the ankle.

 

They also wore skirts and jackets with short or long sleeves. When strolling about outside and along the road, women of wealthy means chose to wear square purple scarves around their shoulders.

 

Portrait from China Ming dynasty. Woman is wearing a Banbi - (半臂, lit. "half arm") also known as Banxiu (半袖) is a form of waistcoat or outerwear that was worn over ruqun, and had half-length sleeves. The style of its collar varies but it can be secured at the front either with ties or a metal button.

According to the Chinese records, banbi clothing style was invented from the short jacket (短襦) that the Chinese wear. It was first designated as a waistcoat for palace maids but soon became popular amongst the commoners. In the "Legend of Huo Xiao Yu" (崔小玉传), written during Tang Dynasty, the main female character Huo Xiaoyu wears this style most of the time.

A beizi (褙子) is an item of traditional Chinese attire common to both men and women, similar to a cloak. Most popular during the Ming dynasty, beizi also known as banbi during the Tang dynasty) are believed to have been adopted from Central Asia during the Tang dynasty through the Silk Road when cultural exchanges were frequent. However, it is also believed to have been derived from banbi during the Song dynasty, where the sleeves and the garment lengthened.

Main article: Chang'ao - Chang-ao (長襖) - formal wear for women - Chang-ao (Chinese: 長襖) is the traditional Chinese attire for women. It is a form of formal wear, and is often perceived as a longer version of ruqun. However, it was actually developed from zhiduo during the Ming Dynasty, and is worn over a skirt.

It is wide-sleeved, shorter than zhiduo and has no side panels (暗擺) at the side slits (thus showing the skirt worn underneath). There is often an optional detachable protective huling (護領, lit. "protect collar") sewn to the collar. The huling can be of white or any other dark colours. The collar is of the same colour as the clothing.

Main article: Daxiushan - A painting of court ladies and one man on horseback, dressed in upper class outing apparel, a 12th-century painting by Li Gonglin, as well as a remake of an 8th-century original by Tang artist Zhang Xuan.

Daxiushan (大袖衫), translated as "Large Sleeve Gown", is a traditional Chinese attire for women and was most popular during Tang dynasty amongst the royal family. After the golden age of Tang Dynasty had ended, the influence of Hufu (胡服), or clothing styles from Central and Western Asia, gradually weakened and Tang royal women's clothing styles begin to take its transformation.

It was not until the Mid-Late Tang period (中晚唐时期) that the distinctions between Royal women's clothing and other style have become increasingly obvious. The width has increased more than four feet and its sleeve is often wider than 1.3 metres.

It features distinctive rode that covers from ground to just above the chest with knot wrapped around the waist, a light and sometimes visible outer coat that ties together at the bottom and often goes along with a long scarf wrapped around the arm.

The clothing often, only cover half of women's breast and so, it is restricted to people of certain status, like princess or gējī. It has come to be known as Da-Xiu-Shan but have been called Dian-Chai-Li-Yi (钿钗礼衣) at various times.

 

The clothing was mainly worn for special ceremonial occasions and have different variations, mainly result of different collar formations (e.g., parallel or cross collar or those with no collar).

Main article: Diyi - Diyi (翟衣) is the traditional Chinese attire worn by empresses and crown princesses (wife of crown prince) in the Ming Dynasty. It is a formal wear meant only for ceremonial purposes. It is a form of shenyi, and is embroidered with long-tail pheasants (翟, Di) and circular flowers (小輪花).

It is worn with phoenix crown (without the dangling string of pearls by the sides). Diyi has been worn by empresses and other royal noblewomen (differs according to different dynasties) since the Zhou dynasty under various names like huiyi (褘衣) in Zhou and Song dynasty, and miaofu (庙服) in Han dynasty.

Lotus shoes (蓮履 / 莲履, lianlǚ) are footwear that were worn by women in China who had bound feet. The shoes are cone or sheath-shaped, intended to resemble a lotus bud. They were delicately constructed from cotton or silk, and small enough to fit in the palm of a hand. Some designs had heels or wedge-shaped soles.

They were made in different styles and colors, and were typically ornately decorated, with embroidered designs of animals or flowers that could continue on the sole of the shoe.

Some designs only fit over the tip of the foot, giving the illusion of a small bound foot when worn under a long skirt. Though foot binding is no longer practised, many lotus shoes survive as artifacts in museums or private collections.

A Phoenix crown (kao) is a Chinese traditional headgear for women. It was worn by noblewomen in the Ming dynasty on ceremonies or official occasions. It is also the traditional headgear for brides. It is adorned with gold dragons, phoenixes made with kingfisher feathers, beaded pheasants, pearls and gemstones.

The number of pearls used ranged from 3426 to 5449 pieces, while the number of gemstones used range from 95 to 128 pieces. These pearls, gemstones and more kingfisher feathers are made into ornamental flowers, leaves, clouds, and bobin (博鬢, the 'wings' at the side/back of the crown). The weight of the entire crown range from 2 to 3 kilograms.

Ruqun (襦裙) is an item of traditional Chinese attire (Hanfu) primarily for women. It consists of a blouse (襦, ru) and a wrap-around skirt (裙, qun). It has a long history, and has been worn by women since the Warring States period.
 

Generally, the blouse was tucked into the skirt. The popularity of ruqun declined during the Han dynasty, but increased again during the Southern and Northern Dynasties.

During the Sui and Tang dyansties, the skirts were tied higher and higher up the waist, until they were eventually tied above the breasts, worn with short blouses.

 

In addition to the normal crossed-collar blouses, parallel/straight-collar (對襟) blouses were also worn in this period, thus exposing the cleavage of the breasts. During the Song dynasty, the skirts were eventually lowered from the breast level back to the normal waistline.

By the Ming Dynasty, ruqun became the most common form of attire for women. The sleeves of the blouse are mostly curved with a narrow sleeve cuff (琵琶袖, pipa sleeve). There is often an optional detachable protective huling (護領, lit. "protect collar") sewn to the collar.

The huling can be white or any other dark colours. The collar is of the same colour as the clothing. Towards the start of the Qing dynasty, the skirt was mostly baizhequn (百摺裙, lit. "hundred pleats skirt") or mamianqun (馬面裙, lit. "horse face skirt").

 

Ming Dynasty portrait of a noblewoman wearing yuanlingshan, phoenix crown and xiapei - Yuanlingshan (圓領衫) was the most common form of attire for both male and female officials and nobles during the Ming Dynasty.
 

The difference between civilian's and officials'/nobles' yuanlingshan is that officials'/nobles' yuanlingshan has a mandarin square (補子) on it.

The sleeves of the yuanlingshan are mostly curved with a narrow sleeve cuff (琵琶袖, pipa sleeve). It has round collar and side slits. Officials'/nobles' yuanlingshan are also wedding attire for commoners.

 

The groom wears a wusha hat (烏紗帽) and the yuanlingshan of a 9th rank official robe. The bride wears the phoenix crown (鳳冠) and a red yuanlingshan with the xiapei (霞帔) of a noblewoman.

Two women wearing cheongsam in a 1930s Shanghai advertisement - The cheongsam is a body-hugging (modified in Shanghai) one-piece Chinese dress for women; the male version is the changshan.

 

It is known in Mandarin Chinese as the qípáo (旗袍; Wade-Giles ch'i-p'ao), and is also known in English as a mandarin gown. The stylish and often tight-fitting cheongsam or qipao (chipao) that is most often associated with today was created in the 1920s in Shanghai and was made fashionable by socialites and upperclass women.

1960s - Around the Cultural Revolution, almost anything seen as part of traditional culture would lead to problems with the Communist Red Guards. Items that attracted dangerous attention if caught in the public included jeans, high heels, Western-style coats, ties, jewelry, cheongsams, and long hair.

These items were regarded as symbols of bourgeois lifestyle, which represented wealth. Citizens had to avoid them or suffer serious consequences such as torture or beatings by the guards. A number of these items were thrown into the streets to embarrass the citizens.

Modern era - Following the relaxation of communist clothing standards in the late 70s, the way the Chinese dressed and the fashion trends of the country changed drastically.

 

Contemporary urban clothing seems to have developed a focus on brand names. In major urban centers, especially Shanghai, an increased western look is preferred, and there is an emphasis on formal wear over casual wear for adults on the streets.

Teenagers prefer brand names and western clothing. Children usually wear clothes decorated with cartoon characters. However, there is also an effort to revive traditional clothing forms such as the hanfu by the hanfu movement.

 

At an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shanghai in 2001, the host presented silk-embroidered tangzhuang jackets as the Chinese traditional national costume.

As smartphones and tablet computers have become increasingly popular, they are some of the most popular ways people gain access to fashion information, along with the Internet and fashion magazines. As to buying clothing, brick-and-mortar stores are still the predominant choice, taking up more than half of the market share.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_clothing_in_China
...

The Moirai (Moerae), also referred to as the Fates, represent the idea of “destiny” in Greek mythology. The Ancient Greeks had a habit of creating deities to represent abstract concepts as a way of explaining their world.
 

However, the Moirai do more than just represent destiny – they are the personification of it. It is understood that the Moirai controlled people’s lives in different ways from the time they were born to the time they died. It is interesting to note that the word, moirai, meant a portion or a part of a whole in Ancient Greek.

 

The connotation here is that it referred to a portion of a bounty, as would be case if people were to divide up a treasure. Thus, the Morai were seen as being keepers of a person’s destiny, or her specific allotment of life.

Who the Moirai (Moerae) Were - It is largely understood that the Moirai, or the Fates, were three of the six children that Themis, the goddess of Justice, and Zeus, the king of the gods, had together.

 

The other three children were the Horai, or the Hours. The names of the three Fates were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. They each had their own, unique characteristics.

Clotho. She was known as the spinner because she “spun” the very thread of a person’s life. She spun the thread from her Distaff directly to her Spindle.

Lachesis – Once Clotho spun the thread, Lachesis would measure it for each person. Each person had different lengths of thread, indicated that they all had different life spans.

Atropos – She was responsible for cutting the thread, which indicates that she controlled when life would end. She also chose the way each person would die. As you can see, Clotho was always associated with the beginning of life.
 

She essentially created it by spinning the thread. Lachesis controlled the length of a person’s life, and Atropos was always associated with death. Thus, the three Fates essentially represent Birth, Life, and Death. The Appearance of the Moirai - Unlike their siblings, the Horai, the Moirai were always depicted as ugly old women.
 

Note that the Horai were always depicted as young, beautiful women. The Ancient Greeks appeared to have feared the Moirai. After all, one of the Fates (Moerae) were said to have controlled every aspect of a person’s life, including their death. As a result, most Ancient Greeks feared them and as a result, they imagined them with unflattering appearances.

 

They were also depicted as crippled, stern, inflexible, and severe. They were usually depicted together as a group of three and they were often depicted with their objects. For instance, Clotho was usually shown with her spindle and Atropos was depicted with her cutting shears.

The Morai, also referred to as the Fates, were an interesting part of Greek mythology. They were three of the children of Themis and Zeus and they were always associated with a person’s destiny.

https://www.greekboston.com/culture/mythology/moirai-fates/
https://books.google.com/books?id=Q7hVDjzAPr0C&pg=PA146&lpg=PA146&dq=morae+,+even+the+gods+have+karma&source=bl&ots=-CG___PUdi&sig=ACfU3U2hBwjXxwXmZX-7scK_H3Z-dAM5nQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwibj6eoy8zoAhUKnq0KHVTxD3IQ6AEwAHoECAgQKQ#v=onepage&q=morae%20%2C%20even%20the%20gods%20have%20karma&f=false

Notes taken from lecture given at the University of Western Georgia: For those raised under monotheistic religions or cultures, the Greek gods and their relation tohumanity may seem alien.
 

Whereas the Hebrews blamed humanity for bringing disorder toGod's harmoniously ordered universe, the Greeks conceived their gods as an expression ofthe disorder of the world and its uncontrollable forces.

To the Greeks, morality is a human invention; and though Zeus is the most powerful of their gods, even he can be resisted by his fellow Olympians and must bow to the mysterious power of fate.

Taken from a yahoo answers post: The Ancient Greeks, according to how you look at it (there are at least two facets to it), believed you cannot escape your fate. Point #1: Everyone goes to the underworld and wishes for the rest of eternity that they were alive. (See The Odyssey by Homer [shades] for more explanation).

The biggest piece of evidence comes from the Fates. They were known as Moirae in Greek. Even the gods feared the Moirae. Zeus also was subject to their power, the Pythian priestess at Delphi once admitted:

When they were three, the three Moirae were: Clotho–"spinner") spun the thread of life from her distaff onto her spindle. Lachesis–"allotter" or drawer of lots) measured the thread of life allotted to each person with her measuring rod.

Atropos–"inexorable" or "inevitable", literally "unturning", sometimes called Aisa) was the cutter of the thread of life. She chose the manner of each person's death; and when their time was come, she cut their life-thread with "her abhorred shears".

 

Her Roman equivalent was Morta ('Death'). As you can see from Atropos, she chose the manner of each person's death. So, SOME Ancient Greeks believed there was no escaping fate. However, the timeline of Ancient Greece is much longer than this.

 

To stay pretty Athenian... Socrates is a good example of someone who might've debated the Fates. He saw and spoke to daemon (spirits), and if so, this is evidence that he may not have taken as a given what this story of the Fates said.

Self-determination of one's own fate would be a debatable concept under the Socratic method. As with many things in philosophy, there is no clear-cut answer to this question.

 

Some Ancient Greeks (mostly the lower, less-educated, common people) would've believed fervently in the Olympian religion, and thus regarded the Fates as quite real. So, the gods determined their fates.

The break-through philosophers and sophists of the time probably did not ascribe to this mentality. To compare and contrast how each (of the many) did ascribe or did not ascribe to this thought is beyond me.

I just can tell you this... some did (commoners) and some did not (the famous philosophers and sophists). Articles and musing on the concept of Fate for the ancient Greeks From Spark Notes based on Mythology by Edith Hamiliton:

The Dominance of Fate - Fate was of great concern to the Greeks, and its workings resonate through many of their myths and texts. We see countless characters who go to great lengths in attempts to alter fate, even if they know such an aim to be futile.

 

The inability of any mortal or immortal to change prescribed outcomes stems from the three Fates: sisters Clotho, who spins the thread of life; Lachesis, who assigns each person’s destiny; and Atropos, who carries the scissors to snip the thread of life at its end.

These three divinities pervade all the stories of Greek myth, whether they be stories of gods, goddesses, demigods, heroes, or mortals and regardless of the exploits recounted. Nothing can be done to alter or prolong the destiny of one’s life, regardless of the number of preparations or precautions taken.

This inflexibility applies just as much to Zeus as to the lowliest mortal, as we see in Zeus’s hounding of Prometheus to divulge the name of the woman who will bear the offspring that one day will kill him.
 

Though this lesson is somewhat consoling—the way of the world cannot be bent to match the whims of those in authority—it is also very disturbing.
 

The prospect of free will seems rather remote, and even acts of great valor and bravery seem completely useless. The myths provide an interesting counterpoint to this uselessness, however.

In virtually all the stories in which a character does everything in his power to block a negative fate, and yet falls prey to it, we see thathis efforts to subvert fate typically provide exactly the circumstances required for the prescribed fate to arise. In other words, the resisting characters themselves provide the path to fate’s fulfillment.

 

A perfect example is the king of Thebes, who has learned that his son, Oedipus, will one day kill him. The king takes steps to ensure Oedipus’s death but ends up ensuring only that he and Oedipus fail to recognize each other when they meet on the road many years later.

 

This lack of recognition enables a dispute in which Oedipus slays his father without thinking twice. It is the king’s exercise of free will, then, that ironically binds him even more surely to the thread of destiny.

This mysterious, inexplicable twinning between will and fate is visible in many the stories and philosophical treatises of the Greeks. Bloodshed Begets Bloodshed Aeschylus’s Oresteia, Sophocles’ Oedipus trilogy, Euripides’ plays, and Homer’s two great epics all demonstrate the irreparable persistence of bloodshed within Greek mythology that leads to death upon death. The royal house of Atreus is most marked in this regard: the house’s ancestor, Tantalus, inexplicably cooks up his child and serves him to the gods, offending the deities and cursing the entire house with the spilling of its blood from generation to generation.

We see the curse manifest when Atreus himself kills his brother’s son and serves him up—an act of vengeance for wrong-doing done to him. Atreus’s son, gamemnon, then sacrifices his own daughter, Iphigenia, as he has been told it will procure good sailing winds for the Greeks to start off to Troy.

Rather, this deed leads his wife, Clytemnestra, to kill him on his first night home, with support from his cousin Aegisthus, who is in turn avenging Atreus’s crimes. Last but not least, Orestes, the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, comes back to kill his mother and Aegisthus.

Articles and musing on the concept of Fate for the ancient Greeks - The Danger of Arrogance and Hubris (defined as pride or arrogance) In many myths, mortals who display arrogance and hubris end up learning, in quite brutal ways, the folly of this overexertion of ego.

The Greek concept of hubris refers to the overweening pride of humans who hold themselves up as equals to the gods. Hubris is one of the worst traits one can exhibit in the world of ancient Greece and invariably brings the worst kind of destruction.

The story of Niobe is a prime example of the danger of arrogance. Niobe has the audacity to compare herself to Leto, the mother of Artemis and Apollo, thus elevating herself and her child ren to the level of the divine.

Insulted, the two gods strike all of Niobe’s children dead and turn her into a rock that perpetually weeps. Indeed, any type of hubris or arrogance, no matter the circumstance, is an attitude that no god will leave unpunished.

Reward for Goodness and Retribution for Evil - The Greeks and Romans incorporated aspects of their ethical codes in their myths. In a sense, these stories are manuals of morality, providing models for correct conduct with examples of which behaviors are rewarded and which are punished.
 

The idea of these myths as moral guides is not unlike the Judeo-Christian morality tales in the Bible. However, while the God of the Bible is an infallible moral authority, the gods who judge good and evil in classical myth harbor their own flaws.

They have favorites and enemies, often for vain reasons—Hera’s jealousy, for example, predisposes her against several entirely innocent women—and are capable of switching sides or abandoning their favorites for no clear reason, as Apollo does to Hector just as Hector faces Achilles in combat.

Aside from their prejudices, of course, the gods are poor moral judges because they frequently act immorally themselves, philandering, raping, lying, and callously using innocent mortals as pawns.

Fate in Ancient Greek mythology "A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what we wills" Schopenhauer. Fate is an interesting concept in Ancient Greek religion.

 

In a universe where gods expressed so many flaws and sometimes unsavory characteristics the Judeo-Christian concept of an 'omnipotent' deity is out of the question. In fact the ruling gods before Zeus, Kronos and Uranous, were even prophesied their own deaths but in the end were unable to do anything about it.

Even the gods themselves could not escape their destinies, and from this point the concept of 'Moira' was devised. Greek philosophy was largely an attempt to apply logic and order to the universe and the idea of Moira fits in nicely with the ancient Greek belief system;

 

In the Homeric poems Moira represents a power over life and death, in some cases can be seen as more powerful than the gods themselves. "Fate is not a god, because otherwise the will of the god would be predestinated".  Thus, Moira represents the personification of a power acting in parallel with the gods in Homer.

Whilst researching this topic I came across an interesting article by J.V.Morrison called 'Kerostasia, The Dictates of Fate and the will of Zeus in the Iliad'.

 

 https://www.instagram.com/dewdropdwelling/

Morrison sites a passage towards the end of the Iliad in the opening to his article. In this passage Achilles is chasing Hector around the Trojan walls, on the forth time round Zeus performs this action.

https://www.auburn.wednet.edu/cms/lib03/WA01001938/Centricity/Domain/2205/Fate%20reading.pdf

Ama (Japanese: 海女, "sea women") are Japanese divers, famous for collecting pearls. They are also known as uminchu (in Okinawan) or kaito (in the Izu Peninsula). The vast majority of ama are women.

Japanese tradition holds that the practice of ama may be 2,000 years old.[1] Traditionally, and even as recently as the 1960s, ama dived wearing only a loincloth. Even in modern times, ama dive without scuba gear or air tanks, making them a traditional sort of free-diver.

Records of the female pearl divers, or ama, date back as early as 927 AD in Japan's Heian period. Early ama were known to dive for seafood and were honored with the task of retrieving abalone for shrines and imperial emperors.

Ama traditionally wear white as it was believed to ward off sharks. Early divers wore only a loin cloth but in the 20th century the divers adopted an all-white sheer diving uniform in order to be more presentable while diving.

Pearl diving ama were considered rare in the early years of diving. However, Mikimoto Kōkichi's discovery and production of the cultured pearl in 1893 produced a great demand for ama. He established the Mikimoto Pearl Island in Toba and used the ama's findings to grow his business internationally.

Nowadays, the pearl diving ama are viewed as a tourist attraction at Mikimoto Pearl island. The number of ama continue to dwindle as this ancient technique becomes less and less practiced due to disinterest in the new generation of women and the dwindling demand for the diving women.
 

In the 1940s 6000 ama were reported active along the coasts of Japan while today ama practice at numbers more along the scale of 60 or 70 divers in a generation.

Women began diving as ama as early as 12 and 13 years old, taught by elder ama. Despite their early start, divers are known to be active well into their 70s and are rumored to live longer due to their diving training and disciplines. In Japan, women were considered to be superior divers due to the distribution of their fat and their ability to hold their breath.

As described above, the garment of the ama have changed throughout time from the original loincloth to white sheer garb and eventually to the modern diving wetsuit. The world of the ama is one marked by duty and superstition. One traditional article of clothing that has stood the test of time is their headscarves.

The headscarves are adorned with symbols such as the seiman and the douman which have the function of bringing luck to the diver and warding off evil. The ama are also known to create small shrines near their diving location where they will visit after diving in order to thank the gods for their safe return.

The ama were expected to endure harsh conditions while diving such as freezing temperatures and great pressures from the depths of the sea. Through the practice, many ama were noted to lose weight during the months of diving seasons.

Ama practiced a breathing technique in which the divers would release air in a long whistle once they resurfaced from a dive. This whistling became a defining characteristic of the ama as this technique is unique to them.

James Bond travels to Japan in the novel You Only Live Twice. He meets and becomes involved with ama Kissy Suzuki. The character was also portrayed in the film version.

The NHK morning television drama Amachan is about the ama. The Dream of the Fisherman's Wife, an 1814 woodblock print by Japanese artist Hokusai, depicts a young ama diver entwined sexually with a pair of octopuses.

Ama Girls, a 1958 documentary film; winner of the Academy Award for Documentary Short Subject. Amanchu! is a Japanese manga series, later adapted into an anime. Its name is a longer version of the word ama, and its subject matter involves female divers.

Amachan was a Japanese television drama series about a high school girl who initially sets out to be come an ama diver. Ama-San, a 2016 documentary film. See also - Haenyeo – Female occupational divers in the Korean province of Jeju. Skandalopetra diving – Freediving using a stone weight at the end of a rope to the surface

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ama_(diving)

To fully appreciate Shakespeare, it's best to see his plays live on stage. It’s a sad fact that today we typically study Shakespeare's plays out of books and forego the live experience. It’s important to remember that the Bard was not writing for today’s literary readership, but for a live audience.

Shakespeare was not writing for just any live audience but was writing for the masses in Elizabethan England, many of whom couldn’t read or write. The theater was usually the only place the audiences to his plays would be exposed to fine, literary culture.

To better understand Shakespeare's works, today's reader needs to go beyond the texts themselves to consider the context of these works: the details of the live theater experience during the Bard’s lifetime.

Theater Etiquette in Shakespeare’s Time - Visiting a theater and watching a play in Elizabethan times was very different from today, not just because of who was in the audience, but because of how people behaved.

Theatergoers were not expected to be still and silent throughout the performance as modern audiences are. Instead, Elizabethan theater was the modern equivalent of a popular band concert. It was communal and even, at times, raucous, depending on the subject matter of a given performance.

The audience would eat, drink, and talk throughout the performance. Theaters were open air and used natural light. Without the advanced technology of artificial light, most plays were performed not in the evening, as they are today, but rather in the afternoon or during the daylight.

Furthermore, plays during that era used very little scenery and few, if any, props. The plays usually relied on language to set the scene. Female Performers in Shakespeare’s Time - The laws for contemporary performances of Shakespeare’s plays banned women from acting.

 

Female roles were thus played by young boys before their voices changed in puberty. How Shakespeare Changed Perceptions of the Theater - Shakespeare saw the public’s attitude towards theater shift during his lifetime. Prior to his era, the theater in England was considered to be a disreputable pastime.

 

It was frowned upon by Puritan authorities, who were worried that it might distract people from their religious teachings. During the reign of Elizabeth I, theaters were still banned within the city walls of London (even though the Queen enjoyed the theater and frequently attended performances in person).
 

But over time, the theater became more popular, and a thriving “entertainment” scene grew on Bankside, just outside the city walls. Bankside was considered to be a “den of iniquity” with its brothels, bear-baiting pits, and theaters.

 

The place of theater in Shakespeare's time widely diverged from its perceived role today as high culture reserved for the educated, upper classes.

The Acting Profession During Shakespeare’s Time - Shakespeare’s contemporary theater companies were extremely busy. They would perform around six different plays each week, which could only be rehearsed a few times before the performance.

 

There was no separate stage crew, as theater companies have today. Every actor and stagehand helped to make costumes, props, and scenery.

The Elizabethan acting profession worked on an apprentice system and therefore was strictly hierarchical. Playwrights themselves had to rise up through the ranks. Shareholders and general managers were in charge and profited the most from the company’s success.

Managers employed their actors, who became permanent members of the company. Boy apprentices were at the bottom of the hierarchy. They usually began their careers by acting in small roles or playing the female characters.

https://www.thoughtco.com/theater-experience-in-shakespeares-lifetime-2985243

I was recently traveling in SE Asia and met a guy from SF who was making some killer absinthe on a small island. He bought rice wine from the locals which came in at over 20% abv and distilled it into a base spirit then infused some of his botanical and finished through a small finishing still with a gin basket for another layer of botanical then did a final infusion for the coloring and the last bit of flavor. It was awesome.

Has anyone ever tried fermenting and or distilling rice? I have some friends who have a farm on a river and there is a nice piece of land in the flood plane that they cant do much with cause it floods almost every year.

Rice gives crazy good yeilds though (like 5 tons an acre!!) Im trying to convince them to try to grow some rice next season (as well as a concoction of herbs/botanicals to use) and do an all local rice based gin/absinthe. Thing is I need to figure out if I can actually make something good before they go building dikes and buying rice seeds.

Ive heard/read that rice needs a particular type of yeast (or at least saki is traditionally made with a particular yeast?). Ive also gotten different estimates on what kind of abv to expect.

Does anyone have any experience that they would like to share on working with Rice? Which varieties? Mash protocols? Milling? Yeast types? PH issues? Fermentation temp? Fermentation time? anything else Im not thinking of?

I tend to just dive into these things then get stuck and go back later and realize I could have avoided problems by just asking first, so here is me trying to reform my ways. Probably picked a bad one to start with =)

I have done rice with Koji, Chinese Yeast Balls (a mixture of Aspergillus oryzae and yeast) and with enzymes (Aspergillus niger) and yeast, EC-1118. You can even malt brown rice.

It all works. The traditional Koji takes a long time to ferment. The enzymes are the fastest. Either way it tastes great. Look to the Saki forums for instructions. Oh...it is a mess to separate mash for stilling! Hope you have a Ban Marie still...

I'm traveling in Cambodia myself at the moment. Rice wine is very popular out in the country. Sometimes it's actual wine and sometimes it's slightly distilled by some methods low budget moonshiners would laugh at (hey, you gotta make due with what you have). The term "wine" is thrown around quite loosely in this region for any alcohol other than beer.

My mother in-law used to help her mother make rice "wine" (she describes using bamboo to cool the steam--so, distilling) back in the 60s and 70s--she says they just used bread and/or regular bread yeast. Clearly though, this is just the way it was done in a poor corner of SE Asia many years ago and may not be the same as what is done now in 2015.

I just bought a bottle of rice "wine". It states multiple times that it is wine, yet it is 35% alcohol. Clearly a distilled spirit. (No reviews on it yet as I'm taking it back to the states).

I can't talk about things technical - Flying Red Pig seems to have the handle on that - but I can say that rice wine is beer under US standards. It is not a malt beverage because it is not brewed with the minimum mlt content, so FDA labeling rules apply, not TTB's.

 

But a person who produces "rice wine" is a brewer and pays taxes as a brewer. Not all beers that contain rice are "rice wines," not by a long shot. Many are malt beverages.

To a brewer in the US, rice is an adjunct. The term "adjunct" includes any grain other than malt. Talking about SE Asia gives rice wine an exotic air, but rice is the second most used adjunct in US brewing.

 

According to the Beer Institute, "The basic ingredients in beer are barley, the hops, water and yeast. Varieties of beer use rice, corn, wheat, sorghum, and other grains. Every year, U.S. brewers purchase:

4.8 billion pounds of barley malt grown or processed in California, Colorado, the Dakotas, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 1.8 billion pounds of rice, corn and other grains from Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska and Texas. 15 million pounds of hops from Idaho, Oregon and Washington.

You find rice in Budweiser, which some craft brewers use as a convenient foil to tout their character. Kind of takes the exotic out of it, right? Rice is an excellent starch for distilling. In fact, I'm rather surprised that no one in the USA has taken that route towards their spirit.

Mastering the use of koji takes some training...temperatures are important. I used to work at a Japanese sake producer, and the road to good sake is a long one. But merely producing alcohol for distilling is not so difficult.

 

As Flying Red Pig mentioned, yeast balls are another way to go, but I have found my results are not consistent, probably because the quality of the yeast balls vary.

 

Enzyme conversion is very easy, but makes a spirit with a very different character, since the fatty acid reactions that produce esters go down a different set of chemical pathways.

 

It all depends on what your actual goals are. A gentleman who works for a VERY large bottler of pre-mixed cocktails once told me that over 75% of their product was rice-based. Food (haha) for thought.

http://adiforums.com/topic/6032-rice-wine/

The earliest known evidence of human alcohol production is from Jiahu, China, where people started making wine from rice, honey, and fruits 9,000 years ago.

 

As a National Geographic article, "Our 9,000-Year Obsession Love Affair With Booze," suggests, alcohol seems to have played a crucial role in the formation of settled societies, as early cultures were producing and consuming alcohol long before they even invented writing.

Evidence at Jiahu demonstrates that the people there had only recently made the transition into farming when alcohol production began. Archaeologist Patrick McGovern, interviewed in the article, argued that while alcohol was "not the only favor driving forward civilization, but it plays a central role."

The importance of alcohol to the development of civilization continued into the Shang dynasty, the earliest known Chinese dynasty that could be verified by its own records. During the Shang dynasty, alcohol was considered to have spiritual powers and to be a luxury substance only available to the elite.

Alcohol was consumed in ritual fashion as a part of state affairs, solidifying bonds between rulers and the elite. Alcohol was given as a gift, and some of the most important items in the Shang dynasty's rich bronze material culture were drinking vessels, like this one in the below image.

While the alcohol Chinese elites consumed was not baijiu, the tradition of drinking at state banquets contributed to the revered status of alcohol in Chinese society. It was not until foreign distillation techniques were introduced to China during the Song or Yuan dynasty that baijiu appeared.

Baijiu was much easier and cheaper to produce than the alcohol consumed by Chinese elites, and it spread quickly throughout China. Today, there are 14,000 distilleries producing baijiu, according to a report by International Wine & Spirits Group.

Premier Zhou Enlai, second in command under Mao Zedong, brought baijiu to the forefront during Nixon's US presidential visit to China in 1972. Zhou told Nixon that Maotai (茅台 Máotái) baijiu, a variety from Guizhou (贵州 Guìzhōu) province gained China international repute when a bottle of it was accidentally dropped at the 1915 World Expo, causing a curiously pungent smell to flood the area. People came to see what it was, and word quickly spread about it.

Chinese baijiu's then pulled an enormous upset at the event, taking the lion's share of the alcohol awards. Zhou also told Nixon that the soldiers of the Red Army came to the town that produced Maotai during the arduous Long March, and their spirits were lifted by the drink. The soldiers then took cases of Maotai with them on their revolutionary exploits.

Zhou once commented,"although alcohol is not good for your health, I dare say that Maotai liquor is healthy." Later, during Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in 1979, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger agreed with him, saying, "I think if we drink enough Moutai we can solve anything."

Baijiu is typically made by mixing steamed sorghum grains, water, and a special fermentation agent called jiuqu (酒曲 jiǔqū). It is then aged in an underground pit or buried jar for anywhere from a month to 30 years. Jiuqu is extremely sensitive to the surrounding environment of the area it is produced in, making the taste of each region's baijiu distinct.
 

Each distillery closely guards its particular strand of jiuqu, and having been made China's national drink in the 1950's, Maotai's strain is even protected as a state secret, part of China's intangible cultural heritage.

A common misconception is that baijiu is a single type of alcohol, but varieties of baijiu can be as different as whiskey and gin. Principally, there are four categories of baijiu, classified by scent (香 xiāng):

"Sauce Fragrance" (酱香 jiàng xiāng): this category is named after its similarity in taste to soy sauce (酱油 jiàngyóu). It has a complex but bold flavor similar which is somewhat of an acquired taste. Requiring the most amount of resources and labor to produce, it is fermented in underground pits.

Sauce fragrance is said to compliment pickled foods (酱菜 jiàngcài) and dishes like sautéed mushrooms and soy-marinated steaks. This fragrance is mainly associated with the southeastern provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou, and includes a subcategory called Mao (茅 Máo), after Maotai.

   

"Strong Fragrance" (浓香 nóng xiāng): this is the most popular type of baijiu, and has a fiery flavor with a faint sweetness. It originates mainly from Sichuan and eastern China and is fermented with either single or multiple types of grain in underground pits.

   

"Light Fragrance" (清香 qīng xiāng): this type of baijiu is made from sorghum and rice husks and fermented in ceramic jars. Some distilleries add barley or peas to give it a sweet taste. It is more common in northern China.

 

One famous variety of light fragrance baijiu is Erguotou (二锅头 Èrguōtóu), a cheap variety that usually sells for around 1 USD per 350ml bottle, and is strongly associated with Beijing. Red Star (红星 Hóngxīng) is a common brand of Erguotou in the city which many construction workers and other working class people consume.

   

"Rice Fragrance" (米香 mǐxiāng): usually made with glutinous or long grain rice, this variety can sometimes incorporate Chinese medicinal herbs, fruits, or tea leaves. It is mainly produced in the Guangdong and Guangxi regions (south China).

 

Most varieties of baijiu are about 50% alcohol by volume, but others are above 60%, which can make it difficult for those unaccustomed to enjoy the taste of baijiu.

 

Furthermore, because the flavors can be unique and unfamiliar to the Western palate, it can be difficult to associate the taste with something you have had before, and start to become familiar with and appreciate it.

The distinct flavors of baijiu are hard to identify by Western terms, but they have been described as funky like aged cheese, savory, masculine, smooth, floral, and fruity.

 

Most Westerns get lost in the complexity and variety of the flavors baijiu can have, and the spirit has not really taken off in the West, although a number of fusion bars in major cities across the US are known to be offering baijiu cocktails for more adventurous customers.

Drinking culture is very important in China, and the ritual of drinking baijiu is typically an important part of building and maintaining guanxi, or relationships.

 

If you are doing business in China, it might be a good idea to familiarize yourself with the taste of baijiu, and be prepared to drink it with partners, colleagues, or friends. In Chinese culture, the more a person gets drunk from being toasted by their company, the more face is conferred upon them.

Baijiu is usually served in tiny thimble-sized wine goblets and toasted many times over one meal or sitting. After toasting with a "ganbei (干杯 gānbēi)," drinkers may attempt to bring their glass lower than yours, which you should also try to do to them to indicate humility.

The baijiu should be downed in one gulp, and then the glass should be held upside down, to demonstrate that you have finished the entire round. If you are unable or uncomfortable with drinking, then you can politely decline (or keep a bottle of water nearby to discreetly swap the baijiu for water before you cheers), but you should remember that drinking baijiu can bridge cultural gaps, and your hosts will be pleased with your willingness to drink it.

http://blog.tutorming.com/expats/what-is-baijiu-the-chinese-alcohol

Grain alcohol is a purified form of ethyl alcohol (ethanol) made from the distillation of fermented grain. The ethanol is produced via fermentation of sugars in the grain by yeast prior to repeated distillation or rectification.
 

The term "grain alcohol" may be used to refer to any ethanol produced from grain or another agricultural origin (as in beer or vodka) or it may be reserved to describe alcohol that is at least 90% pure (e.g., Everclear).

Grain alcohol is a colorless liquid with the chemical formula C2H5OH or C2H6O. Grain alcohol is considered a "neutral spirit," meaning it has no added flavor. Most people would say purified alcohol has a medicinal flavor and a slightly chemical odor.

 

It is flammable and volatile. Grain alcohol is a central nervous system depressant and neurotoxin. Ethanol is the type of alcohol found in alcoholic beverages and used as a recreational drug, but it is also used as a solvent, antiseptic, fuel, and in various industrial applications.

Also Known As: Everclear (brand name), Century (brand name), Gem Clear (brand name), pure alcohol, absolute alcohol, EtOH, pure grain alcohol (PGA), pure neutral spirits (PNS), rectified spirit, rectified alcohol.

Why Grain Alcohol Isn't 100 Percent Pure - Grain alcohol is commonly bottled at 151-proof (75.5 percent alcohol by volume or ABV) and 190-proof (95 percent ABV or about 92.4 percent ethanol by weight).

 

The 190-proof version is prohibited in many U.S. states and other locations because it's considered too easy for people to get alcohol poisoning using the product.

There is no 200-proof (100 percent ABV) grain alcohol for human consumption because of azeotropic effects during the distillation process. Fractional distillation can only concentrate ethanol at a ratio of 96 alcohol to 4 water, by weight.

To further purify ethanol from grain alcohol or another source, it's necessary to add an entraining agent, such as benzene, heptane, or cyclohexane. The addition forms a new azeotrope that has a lower boiling point and is made of ethyl alcohol, water, and the entraining agent.

Water-free ethanol may be obtained by removing the lower-boiling azeotrope, but contamination by the entraining agent makes the alcohol unfit for human consumption (not to mention, pure alcohol is of itself highly toxic).

At lower pressures (less than 70 torr or 9.3 kPa), there isn't an azeotrope and it's possible to distill absolute alcohol from an ethanol-water mixture. However, this procedure (vacuum distillation) is not presently economically viable.

Of course, grain alcohol may be further purified by simply adding a desiccant or using a molecular sieve to remove the water. Grain Alcohol and Gluten - There is some disagreement about whether or not grain alcohol, under any definition, causes problems for people with celiac disease or gluten sensitivity.
 

From a chemical standpoint, whiskey (usually made from rye), vodka (usually made with wheat), and Everclear (typically made from corn) do not contain gluten because of the distillation process. Yet, there are reports of people experiencing problems.

When a reaction occurs, it could result from contamination at the processing facility or because a grain product was added back into the product. The gluten zein in corn is typically well-tolerated by people with celiac disease, so grain alcohol from that source should be fine. Alcohol from another source, such as grapes or potatoes, presents another option.

https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-grain-alcohol-3987580

The major is often badmouthed as the villain of the Little Bighorn, but eyewitnesses insisted Reno was no coward—and he was in fact exonerated. “What do you do when you’re branded, and know you’re a man?’

That question comes up in the theme song of the 1965–66 NBC-TV Western Branded, starring Chuck Connors as Jason McCord, a former U.S. Cavalry captain. McCord is the lone white survivor of the fictional (but Little Bighorn-like) massacre at Bitter Creek, caused by the mental deterioration of the commanding general (read, George Armstrong Custer).

Most believe McCord’s survival was due to cowardice, and after a court-martial he is stripped of his rank and forced to leave the service. In the show’s opening titles, as a drum beats and the theme song plays, McCord’s commander rips the decorations from his uniform and breaks his saber in two, tossing the hilt half through the fort gate. McCord then stoically exits.

As the gates close behind him, he picks up the broken weapon and studies it, pondering his fate. The exiled McCord travels the West from job to job, running from his undeserved reputation as a coward, but wherever he goes, it seems his reputation has preceded him.

 

He generally suffers the outrages and assaults in silence, though the scars remain a constant reminder of the injustice of his fate. It could just as well have been the story of Major Marcus Reno.

Standard depictions of Reno’s conduct at the Battle of the Little Bighorn are unflattering to say the least. On the hot afternoon of June 25, 1876, Reno led three companies of 7th U.S. Cavalry down the valley of the Little Bighorn to attack the combined Sioux and Northern Cheyenne village while Lt. Col. George A. Custer led five companies along the bluffs to attack from the north.

Reno balked when he saw the large village and quickly fell back to a riverside position amid timber. He might have held out for some time, giving Custer a chance to put his unknown plan into action, but Indians infiltrated the timber.
 

When a warrior shot Arikara scout Bloody Knife in the head, blood and brains spattered Reno’s face, totally discomposing the major. As Bloody Knife fell from his saddle, Reno reportedly shouted, “Dismount!” followed shortly by, “Mount!”

 

Soldiers who heard the commands followed him out and rode for the perceived safety of the high bluffs across the river. Not everyone heard, however, and the rush to the river was chaotic. Some men remained in the timber, some escaped, others died crossing the river—but the majority made it.

Nevertheless, Reno’s career and life were virtually over. Peers branded him a coward, especially since Lt. Col. George A. Custer and his immediate command were wiped out on nearby “Last Stand Hill.” The rest of Reno’s time on this earth was hell. He might as well have been killed with the 33 soldiers and scouts who died during the valley fight and retreat.

While the dismount/mount commands, likely followed by a command to charge to the rear, forever stamped Reno with a “c” for coward, one question lingers through the 135 years of finger pointing: Did it happen as has been depicted? The 7th Cavalry had been soundly whipped. The commands of Reno and Captain Frederick Benteen had barely held out on what became known as Reno Hill.

The unit’s iconic commander, Custer, was dead. Many found it unthinkable that a band of “savages” could have defeated the regiment. There had to be a reason. The nation’s eyes turned toward both the dead and the living before honing in on Reno. What kind of monster was he?

Custer, who had risen to brevet major general during the Civil War, had his detractors. First reports blamed him for mistakes that led to the debacle, and Generals Alfred Terry, William Sherman and President Ulysses S. Grant followed the line that Custer had disobeyed orders and brought the disaster upon himself. On the other hand, Custer had many devotees, and they challenged that interpretation.

Frederick Whittaker and Custer’s friend Thomas Rosser wrote magazine and newspaper essays, fingering Reno as the main cause for the defeat. Within five months of the battle Whittaker had written and published a massive hagiographic tome in praise of Custer. With the support of widow Libbie Custer, his outcry for an investigation into the matter led to a court of inquiry.

At the time Reno was on a two-year suspension, having been charged with “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” in an 1877 court-martial that found him guilty of indiscretions with a fellow officer’s wife. Because of the suspension and the unending accusations against him, Reno welcomed the inquiry.

The court met at Chicago’s Palmer House on January 13, 1879, and the proceedings ran for 26 days. Twenty-three witnesses testified in regard to Reno’s conduct. “I could not find any fault,” Lieutenant George D. Wallace said. “I think it was good.” Asked whether Reno showed fear, Wallace answered, “None.” Asked whether Reno showed lack of military skill, he answered, “No.”

Lieutenant Charles A. Varnum said Reno did not have enough men to hold the timber and that “certainly there was no sign of cowardice” on his part. Dr. Henry R. Porter said the situation in the woods had “flurried” Reno, but his conduct was normal.

 

Porter, who was within earshot of Reno, heard no orders to dismount/ mount but did hear Reno say, “We have got to get out of here—we have got to charge them!”

Captain Myles Moylan said Reno rode at the head of the column, and that his orders “were given as coolly as a man under such circumstances usually can give them, and I saw nothing that indicated cowardice about him.” Lieutenant Luther Hare believed that if Reno did not take the men out of the woods, “we would be shut in so that we could not get out.”

As to whether Reno lacked courage, Hare said, “I know of no instances of cowardice at any time.” Asked whether Reno showed any sign of cowardice after the companies retreated to the bluffs across the river, Hare said, “I did not.”

Lieutenant Charles DeRudio was relieved Reno had halted his charge into the village, for he believed the companies “would have been butchered” had they continued. DeRudio saw Reno in action for 10 minutes while fighting in the timber and “admired his conduct.”

 

Sergeant Edward Davern testified that he saw no cowardice on Reno’s part, and Sergeant Ferdinand A. Culbertson similarly replied, “None at all.”

Benteen brought up his three companies to meet Reno on the bluffs and did not see the major in the valley, but on the hilltop. The captain testified, “[Reno] was about as cool as he is now.”

 

When asked if he saw any evidence of cowardice, Benteen answered, “None whatever.” Lieutenant Winfield S. Edgerly met Reno on the bluffs and said he was “excited, but not enough to impair his efficiency,” and that throughout the siege “he seemed very cool.”

Civilian packers B.F. Churchill and John Frett had a dustup with Reno during the night of June 25. Reno demanded to know why they were not on the battle line. They argued. Frett claimed Reno had a bottle of whiskey in his hand, and when the major tried to strike him, “the whiskey flew over me, and he staggered.”
 

The implication that Reno was drinking, or was drunk, also weighed against him, but the fact was that many officers and men in the frontier army drank whenever they had the opportunity. It did not necessarily make them unfit to command.

Edgerly saw Reno that night and said he was “perfectly sober.” Reno’s counsel asked Wallace if he saw evidence of insobriety, and the lieutenant said he never even heard the accusation until the court convened. Benteen said Reno was entirely sober at the time.

 

When Reno’s counsel asked if he could have been “staggering and stammering” that night, Benteen responded, “Not without my knowing it.” In fact, Benteen added, had he known that Reno had any whiskey, “I would have been after some.”

A politician once made a similar accusation of drunkenness against General Ulysses Grant to President Abraham Lincoln. “So Grant gets drunk, does he?” queried Lincoln. “Yes, he does, and I can prove it,” the man replied. 

“Well,” Lincoln answered, “you needn’t waste your time getting proof; you just find out, to oblige me, what brand of whiskey Grant drinks, because I want to send a barrel of it to each one of my generals.” Drinking in the frontier Army was not necessarily an evil.

Captain Edward S. Godfrey, who did not like Reno, said he was “not particularly impressed” with Reno’s leadership and saw signs of “nervous timidity.” Captain Edward G. Mathey countered Godfrey, stating that Reno showed no sign of drunkenness and adding, “I saw no action on his part to indicate want of courage or indicating cowardice.”

Of Reno’s actions on the hilltop, Captain Thomas McDougall said he was “perfectly cool [and]…was as brave as any man there, in my opinion.” Describing the second day of battle, when Reno walked the line with bullets flying, McDougall said Reno “had plenty of nerve.”

Of all the witnesses called, only two were critical of Reno’s conduct in the valley. Civilian interpreter Frederic F. Girard, whom Reno had once fired, said he thought Reno could have held out in the timber as long as the ammunition lasted. (Left unsaid was that at the rate they had been firing, that would not likely have been more than another half-hour.)

Civilian scout George Herendeen also disliked Reno. He said that when Bloody Knife was killed and another soldier hit, “Reno gave the order to dismount, and the soldiers had just struck the ground when he gave the order to mount, and then everything left the timber on a run.”

 

Herendeen said the incident “demoralized him [Reno] a good deal,” but when pressed by court recorder Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee, Herendeen stated, “I am not saying that he is a coward at all.”

The court of inquiry ended on February 10, and the presiding officers—Colonel John H. King, Colonel Wesley Merritt and Lt. Col. William B. Royall—wrote their official judgment: “The conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates in some instances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which required the animadversion [criticism] from this court.”

The judge advocate general concurred with the court “in its exoneration of Major Reno,” as did Sherman, Grant and Secretary of War George W. McCrary. Reno was vindicated. Congratulatory letters came in from around the country. He was pleased with the findings. Now perhaps his life would get back to normal.

It was not to be. Libbie Custer was furious, and Whittaker claimed the verdict was “a complete and scientific whitewash.” Custer believed that Merritt’s old rivalry with her husband had influenced his verdict, and
 

Whittaker claimed the witnesses were enticed by Chicago’s “ladies of pleasure” to make favorable comments. He sent a scathing letter to The Chicago Times, charging that Grant, Reno, Benteen and others had initially charged Custer with rashness and disobedience.

Whittaker sought “to vindicate Custer as a soldier,” but the court had not gone far enough in that direction. He sought to prove Reno the villain, but he was barred from serving as accuser or prosecutor.
 

The court of inquiry, Whittaker said, showed Custer to have been prudent, and that he was “not defeated by the enemy, but abandoned by the treachery or timidity of his subordinates.” The testimony was in, but Whittaker refused to accept it. He seemed to know better than the men who were there.

Reno’s suspension from rank and pay would end within six weeks. He was only 44 years old, had been in the Army most of his life, and he looked forward to rejoining his regiment, the clouds of suspicion and accusation lifted from his head. The coming years, however, would be cruel.

What had gone wrong? Reno’s Civil War career had been creditable; he’d demonstrated bravery on several occasions and been commended for handling his men “gallantly and steadily” and praised for his “coolness, bravery and good judgment.” Even General Philip Sheridan, a tough taskmaster, characterized Reno as “full of energy and ability.”

Reno drank some, but so did thousands of other officers, and it never impaired his abilities. Only later in life, when he was unable to shake off the millstone of “cowardice,” did his drinking get him into trouble and accelerate his slide into disgrace.

 

He’d never had an appealing personality, and after years of being “branded,” it became downright disagreeable. His young wife died, and he was left with the emotional pain and concerns of raising a child alone.
 

Reno became morose, a martinet and a man who smoked constantly and seemed to welcome alcohol-induced oblivion, with its implicit promise of an early grave.

In 1880 Reno faced fresh charges for striking a junior officer, for being a “peeping Tom” and for being drunk while on duty at Fort Meade in Dakota Territory. He was found guilty and dismissed from service, for “conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.”

 

Reno tried vigorously for the rest of his life to clear his name, but to no avail. He remarried, but that ended in a divorce. Broken, Reno died of throat cancer on March 30, 1889.

He was buried in an unmarked grave at Glenwood Cemetery in Washington, D.C. In 1967 a great-grandnephew pressed to have the major’s remains exhumed and reburied at Custer National Cemetery on the Little Bighorn Battlefield in Montana.

 

The events that day in June 1876 had destroyed his life as surely as if he had been physically killed there. Reno’s detractors had seemingly gotten their wish. They had broken Reno and eventually tainted nearly everyone’s opinion of him.
 

Fred Whittaker and Tom Rosser in particular, who had not been at the Little Bighorn, seemed to revel in publicly excoriating Reno, as if by destroying him could they elevate their hero, Custer. It worked.

But how? An examination of the court record shows that 20 of the 23 eyewitnesses who testified to Reno’s conduct had neutral or favorable observations. Only three were unfavorable—and none of those damning.

Yet scarcely mentioned is Porter’s account of Reno’s statement, “We have got to get out of here—we have got to charge them!” Instead, Herendeen’s claim that Reno ordered a dismount and an immediate mount appears often in print. It seems incredible.

 

One man claims Reno issued conflicting orders while extracting his command from a desperate situation, and it snowballs into an avalanche of cowardice and treachery.

This doesn’t equate to a rational examination of evidence. Facts are bowing to gut reaction. Reno was not a villain; neither were Benteen or Custer. No, the persistent misrepresentation of Reno as a treacherous coward is largely attributable to an idiosyncrasy of the American character: our penchant for conspiracy theory, for voodoo history.

More important than the man is the myth. We relish a hidden story about a sinister villain involved in a government cover-up. Americans love their conspiracy theories. Some of it stems from an anti-intellectual current flowing beneath the surface of our history.

 

 The Reno Court of Inquiry exonerated Marcus Reno and cleared him of charges of treachery and cowardice, but many Americans refused to believe it.

Custer, a Civil War hero and the idol of thousands, could not have made mistakes that led to his own downfall; there had to have been sinister forces working toward his destruction. “Savages” could not have defeated the 7th U.S.
 

Cavalry in battle; perfidious whites who despised Custer must have been behind it. In truth, there were no villains in the classic sense, and the Army did not lose the battle as much as the Indians won it.

One can readily ascertain the predilections of the Custer crowd as they smirk, wink knowingly and affirm that Reno was a coward who turned tail, and that Benteen purposely dawdled in the hope that Custer would die (see “Benteen: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” by Robert Barr Smith, in the June 2010 Wild West).

 

They might agree the inquiry testimony was largely favorable to Reno, but only because mysterious forces saw to it that witnesses who would have testified against Reno were conveniently dead or not allowed to testify.

Custer was the victim, while Reno, Benteen and other officers who testified at the court of inquiry were participants in a grand cover-up. It is nearly impossible to break through this mindset. How do we get beyond it?
 

One way might be to simply apply Ockham’s razor to the seeming intricacies and conundrums of history. Basically, it means that one hypothesis is more plausible than another if it involves fewer assumptions. Keep it simple.

The overwhelming testimony of eyewitnesses to the June 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn did not find Reno a perfidious coward. He was exonerated. Yet, the facts are disbelieved. The conspiracy-minded who see secret agendas and government or business cover-ups everywhere continue to dominate, to the detriment of sense and understanding.

Marcus Reno was not a monster. Those who denigrate Reno to elevate Custer are not providing true insight and are doing us a disservice. Reason backed by evidence should be our guides. When we stray from those tenets, our history suffers for it.

Gregory Michno is a Wild West special contributor. For further reading see In Custer’s Shadow: Major Marcus Reno, by Ronald H. Nichols, and Reno Court of Inquiry, edited by Nichols.

https://www.historynet.com/misrepresented-monster-major-marcus-reno.htm

Born on 15 November 1834, in Carrollton, Illinois, Reno entered West Point Military Academy on 1 September 1851. It took him almost six years to graduate, mostly due to acquiring demerits for being tardy. Reno ranked 20th in a class of 38, graduating in June 1857.

Reno commanded the 7th Cavalry during Custer's absence through the winter and early spring of 1876. During this time the full regiment was brought together for the planned campaign against the Lakota and Cheyenne south of the Yellowstone River in southeastern Montana.
 

Custer returned to Fort Abraham Lincoln in early May. Major Reno was second in command of the 7th Cavalry as part of the Dakota Column headed by General Alfred Terry which left the fort on May 17, 1876.

Major Reno led the scouting efforts with six companies of the 7th from June 10-19. Discovering that the large Indian village had moved from the Rosebud River west to the Bighorn valley, the 7th Cavalry left the Yellowstone River on June 22. This was part of a pincers movement against the American Indian village.

A painting showing a number of military men on horses crossing a river. On the other side of the river are high bluffs. Major Marcus Reno and Companies A, G and M crossing the south end of the Little Bighorn river and retreating up the bluffs.

On June 25, Custer's Crow scouts located the village of Lakota and Cheyenne people, estimated today at over 8,000 individuals. As the 7th Cavalry approached the Little Bighorn River, Reno was directed to take three companies and cross the river and attack the village from the south. At that time Custer told Reno he would support him with the "whole outfit."

As Reno approached the village hundreds of warriors responded to meet him. Reno called a halt, had his men dismount and form into a skirmish line. After a short time Reno's skirmish line was flanked and he fell back to the woods along the river.

 

For a time Reno's battalion held out in the woods as the Indian warriors surrounded the soldiers. When the Lakotas and Cheyennes fighting him began to infiltrate the woods, Reno decided his defensive position was untenable. At that time Arikara scout Bloody Knife was shot in the head while Reno tried to communicate with him.

Reno mounted his troops and led them in a headlong charge that became a retreat and then a mad run for life to the bluffs across the river. Some men from Company G were left in the woods; those that left late were killed, those that stayed in the woods eventually made it back to Reno's defensive position across the river.

Soon the Indian defenders left Reno's front to respond to Custer's threat further down river. Shortly before this Captain Benteen's battalion of three companies arrived at Reno's position in response to Custer's comminque.

Reno rushed out to Benteen and said, "For God's sake, Benteen, halt your command and help me! I've lost half my men!" In the meantime firing was heard down river and Captain Weir sought Reno's permission to move Company D towards the sound of the firing. Eventually the pack train came up and with the wounded Reno attempted to move the command to follow Weir.

The Lakota and Cheyenne warriors responded to the soldiers' appearance on the high ground to the south and forced Reno back to his original position on the bluffs. Into the next day (June 26) the remainder of the 7th Cavalry commanded by Reno and Benteen held out under heavy fire from the Indian warriors.

 

With the approach of General Terry's column, the warriors broke off the siege of Reno's position and the great village moved off to the south. Reno's men learned of Custer's fate from Terry's column on June 27.

Ramifications of the Battle - After learning the fate of Custer's battalion, the men under Reno's command were grateful for their survival. However, in a short time following the battle Reno came under considerable criticism from disparate elements both within and outside the army.

Reno was accused of not prosecuting the attack on the village as ordered and of not coming to Custer's support. Though Reno's actions at the Little Bighorn were never officially criticized by the army command, he called for a Court of Inquiry into his actions at the battle to officially exonerate his name.

On February 10, 1879, after extensive interrogation of the officers and civilians present at the battle, the court concluded the following:

"…while subordinates in some instances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there is nothing in his conduct which required [adverse criticism] from the Court."

Ultimately, the criticism of his conduct at Little Bighorn was only one element which conspired to end Reno's military career. After the loss of his wife in 1874, Reno descended into alcoholism.
 

Altercations with fellow officers and inappropirate advances towards women initially resulted in a two year suspension from the army. He was eventually dismissed from the army, effective 1 April 1880. Marcus Reno unsuccessfully sought reinstatement into the army for many years. He died as a result of mouth cancer on 30 March 1889.

https://www.nps.gov/libi/learn/historyculture/major-marcus-reno.htm

Trumpeter Giovanni Martini was the last white man to see Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer alive. He also became the first enlisted man to serve as a scapegoat for the catastrophe at the Little Bighorn.

There was plenty of blame to go around after five companies of the 7th Cavalry were virtually exterminated on June 25, 1876, and most of it fell on Custer’s two top subordinates:

Major Marcus Reno, accused by Custer’s partisans of cowardice in the face of the enemy; and Captain Frederick Benteen, who earned the Medal of Honor for heroism on the periphery of Custer’s Last Stand but failed to break through the Indians with the remaining seven companies of the 7th Cavalry, some of whom lived into the 1920s, or in one case into the 1950s.

Benteen, in particular, shifted the blame onto trumpeter John Martin—born in Italy as Giovanni Martini. If Private Martini had not garbled the message Colonel Custer sent back to Benteen, the irascible captain argued, the rescue attempt by Benteen’s and Reno’s seven companies might have proceeded with greater urgency.
 

Subsequently, members of the antiCuster faction in the polarized world of Custer historians have seen the bugler as a bungler and wondered why Custer entrusted a vital message to an Italian immigrant who couldn’t speak English.

Martini’s real message—the one he told Indian wars researcher Walter Mason Camp in 1917—got lost in the shuffle and was only revealed in the 1980s through the battlefield archaeology of Richard Allan Fox. The man accused of contributing to the disaster through confused communications actually made what really happened all clear for the first time.

 

As cited by Fox, Martini brought back word to his buddies (but perhaps not to Benteen) that the Indian village was bare of warriors and was targeted by Custer for a roundup of women and children.

The basic facts are clear: On June 25 Custer had split the 7th Cavalry into four elements, hoping to surround the Lakota and Cheyenne Indians he was trailing and bring them back to their agencies.
 

The sight of the biggest Indian village any of the soldiers had ever seen on the Little Bighorn prompted Custer to send his trumpeter, Martini, back to inform Captain Benteen and his three companies of the size of the village and the need for speed at about 2:45 p.m. Custer’s adjutant, Canadian-born Lieutenant William W. Cooke, put the message in writing:

Benteen. Come on. Big Village. Be quick. Bring Packs. P.S. Bring Packs.

Martini took off on his tired horse; met “forage master” Boston Custer, who passed him going the other way at a run to join his two older brothers, George and Tom Custer; and reached Benteen and his three companies just as firing was breaking out in the distance.

 

“What’s the matter with your horse?” the crusty Benteen demanded. “He’s just tired out, I guess,” the trumpeter said. “Tired out!” Benteen snapped. “Look at his hip! You’re lucky it wasn’t you!”

Martini looked and saw that his horse had been shot and that blood had splattered onto his own back. Benteen—who later reported that Martini had told him the Indians were “skedaddling”—stopped to water his own companies’ horses before he advanced toward the insistent sound of gunfire.
 

As Benteen reached the hills overlooking the Little Bighorn, he saw Reno’s troopers fleeing from the timber and up the side of what came to be called Reno Hill. Benteen quickly diverted to assist Reno, but stopped in the drive to reach Custer as ordered in writing.

Martini was immediately advanced to the role of scapegoat as Benteen reflexively blamed the misleading news on the messenger, “a thick-headed, dull-witted Italian, just about as much cut out for a cavalryman as he was for a king.

He in formed me that the Indians were ‘skidaddling’…we saw going on what was obviously not skedaddling on the part of the Indians, as there were 12 or 14 men on the river bottom and they were being ridden down and shot by 800 or 900 Indian warriors….We concluded that the lay of the land had better be investigated a bit, as so much of the Italian trumpeter’s story hadn’t panned out.”

Benteen rescued what was left of Reno’s command, and his courage in the fight on Reno Hill won him the admiration of the enlisted survivors. Martini joined Reno and Benteen in the defense of Reno Hill, and his trumpet call was the first contact with General Alfred Terry, who arrived on June 27 to rescue Reno and Benteen’s seven companies and find out that Custer’s five companies had been wiped out.

Benteen’s foot-dragging response when other officers wanted to ride to Custer’s rescue—given his hatred of Custer and coupled with the visible panic of Major Reno—led to a court of inquiry in Chicago in 1879 to try to fix blame for the defeat.
 

Benteen advanced one possible candidate: Martini. Benteen implied that if the Italian trumpeter hadn’t confused the message, Benteen would have shown more haste in his ride to Custer’s relief.

Martini, who also testified briefly, denied that he had ever used the term “skedaddle” to describe the response of the Indians—and may not have known at that time what the Civil War slang term meant. He also told Camp later that he didn’t think anybody at the court of inquiry wanted to know the truth.

History has not been kind to Benteen’s attempt to deflect the blame onto Martini. Louise Barnett, author of Touched By Fire, said that Benteen’s testimony must have been a lie. She debunked Benteen’s statement that Martini’s “language conveyed the impression to me that they were in possession of the village, that the Indians were all skedaddling, to use his own words.”

Martini had been sent back by Custer before Custer’s five companies were anywhere near the village, and the words in Cooke’s penciled notes are an explicit request for support. “Benteen failed Custer and the regiment,” Custer biographer Jeffry Wert concluded, though he added that Custer himself was primarily to blame for the debacle.

Charles M. Robinson III pointed out in A Good Year To Die that Martini, to qualify as an orderly, would have to have shown that he could repeat a 20-word order verbatim.

 

Martini was treated as a buffoon by some of the revisionists who blamed Custer not only for the disaster but also for the nation’s Indian policy. The fact of the matter is that Martini delivered a clear message, and blame has to fall elsewhere.

Martini’s most crucial message to history, however, wasn’t made clear until Fox incorporated it to explain his findings when he analyzed the spent slugs and cartridge cases of the Little Bighorn battlefield in the 1980s. Fox cited Martini and several Indians to show that Custer did not get near the village before warriors with repeaters rallied to attack him.

Camp had interviewed Martini in 1908 and paraphrased his understanding of the situation: “Custer halted command on the high ridge about 10 minutes, and officers looked at the village through glasses. Saw children and dogs playing among the tepees but no warriors or horses.

There was then a discussion among the officers as to where the men might be and someone suggested they might be buffalo hunting….Custer now made a speech to his men saying, ‘We will go down and make a crossing and capture the village.’

 

The whole command pulled off their hats and cheered. And the consensus of opinion seemed to be among the officers that if this could be done the Indians would have to surrender when they would return in order not to fire on their women and children.”

The warriors, however, were not hunting buffalo but sleeping off an all-night dance—either a victory celebration after the defeat of General George S. Crook on the Rosebud on June 17; or, as plausible Lakota sources told Mildred Fielder many years later, a courtship dance where young men gyrated to attract young women, and the fathers and mothers stayed up to drum and chaperone.

When the warriors exploded out of the tepees armed with more than 200 repeating rifles, Custer was overwhelmed by superior firepower—suggesting that Benteen and Reno couldn’t have done much good even if they had arrived in time.
 

As Fox confirmed: The Little Bighorn was not a clash of races for control of the continent, but an attempt at a hostage situation that went sour because the potential victims had too many guns.

Martini, however, was not a culprit— nor was he unable to speak English in 1876. His account of Custer’s speech, confirmed by Fox’s archaeology and the best Indian accounts, revealed what actually happened. He was also a good soldier. Born in Rome in 1851, Giovanni Martini was a 14-year-old drummer boy with the Italian freedom fighters of Guiseppe Garibaldi.

Later on, in the American West, he served in the Nez Perce campaign with the 7th Cavalry, reenlisted in the 3rd Artillery, transferred to the 4th Artillery and was finally promoted to trumpeter sergeant in 1900.

He retired from the Army in 1904, raised two sons who also enlisted— one was named after Custer—and died in December 1922, respected by people who knew him personally.

“A fine old soldier, who has deserved well both of his own and his adopted country, for besides his long and honorable service, Martin has given two stalwart sons to the American Army,” Colonel W.A. Graham wrote in The Custer Myth.

“Martini was a salty little Italian who had been a drummer boy with Garibaldi in the fight for Italian independence,” the German-born Charles Windolph, a Medal of Honor recipient at the Little Bighorn, wrote. “We used to tease him a lot but we never did after this fight. He proved he was plenty man.”

https://www.historynet.com/giovanni-martini-message-got.htm

That’s a question that has been asked time and again and argued over till the truth has been almost lost. There are two camps, one for Custer and one against and I feel that this polarisation has lead to the truth becoming a casualty of war, the war about Custer and who he was.

George Armstong Custer’s character is hard to define without becoming very partisan. Some take the view that he was one of the best cavalry leaders of his time and quote his Civil War record and his operations against the Indians. Most of them will allow that he made some mistakes and also was not blameless as a human being.

The other side seems to demonise Custer in every way. History tells us that he was last in his class at West Point, altogether reckless in warfare, cruel and uncaring about the men under his command, politically ambitious but politically naïve.

 

It is also claimed that Custer was so wrapped up in himself that he would use anybody in any way to further his own ambitions. I don’t think either view of him tells the full story, so let’s take a look at some of the facts, as we know them after 140 years of reflection.

Custer was born the son of a blacksmith and was very wanted and loved as a child. As a young man he soon became aware that if he wanted to rise in the world being the son of a working class father was not in his favour.
 

One of the few ways of rising in the American social world of the 1850/60’s was to become an officer and a gentleman, and to win the hand of the girl he loved this was imperative.

Custer, with the help of some political friends managed to get a place at West Point in 1857 passing out in 1861. Custer’s time at West Point has been very well documented, and yes, he did accrue the most demerits ever at West Point, and he did pass out bottom of his class.
 

However, he had the sense and determination to pass out and become an officer in the American Military and so made the move into the ranks of gentlemen. No one can take that away from his record.

So what about his Civil War career? Being in the right place at the right time, always willing to put himself in danger without a second thought was a way of getting noticed, and he did!

 

Whilst working as a staff officer for Major General George B. McClellan, then commander of the Army of the Potomac, Custer was promoted to the rank of temporary captain. When McClellan was relieved of command in November 1862 Custer reverted to his rank of first lieutenant.

He then fell under the gaze of Major General Alfred Pleasonton then in command of a Cavalry Division. After the battle of Chancellorsville Pleasonton was given command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac in 1863.
 

Pleasanton recognised Custer’s leadership qualities and three days before the battle of Gettysburg Pleasonton promoted Custer from Captain to Major General giving him command of the Michigan Brigade of Cavalry.

Custer was one of the youngest Major Generals in the Union Army and was depicted in the press as (2)“The Boy General”. By the end of the war Custer had gone on to win many honours and ended up as a household name. He was present at General Robert E. Lee’s signing of the surrender document in the Appomattox Court House in 1865.

Custer, being Custer, rode away from the Court House after the surrender with the table on which the surrender document had been signed balanced on his head.

 

General Sheridan had presented Custer with the table as a souvenir of the signing, and as a gift for his wife. The table is now in the Smithsonian Institution but sadly there is no record of what Elizabeth Custer said on receiving the gift!

Custer and Gen Pleasonton on horseback - So what about Custer after the war? In 1866 Custer was mustered out of the volunteer army and reverted to the regular army with the rank of Captain in the 5th Cavalry.
 

On September 21st 1866 Custer took command of the newly formed 7th Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. However, due to the intervention of General Sheridan he obtained a brevet appointment as a Major General.

 

A brevet authorised a commissioned officer to hold a higher rank with pay but only for the duration of the assignment. It is from this point that I think we start to see why things went so wrong for Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

 

In 1867 the American Government decided to bring the Southern Cheyenne under control by a show of force. They gave command to a Civil War hero, Winfield Scott Hancock with a mixed force of 1400 men including infantry, artillery and Custer’s 7th Cavalry.

Hancock’s brief was first to try to talk the Cheyenne onto a reservation but if that failed to force them to comply. The whole campaign turned into a total disaster because of Hancock’s misunderstanding of the Indians’ determination not to accept the white man’s rule.

It was about this time that it began to dawn on Custer how difficult it was to track and fight Indians. Conventional forces moved far too slowly and needed a very cumbersome logistic train to back them up. Indians could, and did travel a lot faster than white troops even with their families in tow.

 

Indians had a great advantage over American troops because their ponies could survive on grass and did not need oats like the cavalry horses. Thus they were able to travel much faster than the troopers.

The other problem was finding Indians in the first place. Indians could see the troops coming long before the troops had any idea they were getting close to a village so the Indians could move away very quickly.

 

 

An entire Indian village could move lock stock and barrel in about half an hour and then move faster than the troops trying to catch them. The Indians also had the advantage of knowing the country intimately.

At the end of the summer long campaign Custer was desperate to see his wife. He deserted his command and for this action was court-martialled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for being AWOL. He was suspended for one year without pay missing the 1868 summer campaign.

The 1868 campaign, commanded this time by Gen. Phil Sheridan, was as dismal as Hancock’s 1867 effort had been. However it decided Sheridan that it was virtually impossible to catch Indians in the summer. Sheridan now advocated total war against the Cheyenne who like most other tribes went into more permanent camps in the winter.

 

Sheridan wanted a winter campaign: he also wanted Custer whom he admired. So at his request, Custer was allowed to return to duty with the 7th before his term of suspension had expired.

Brevet Major General G A C in service dress 1865 - The Battle of the Washita. Under Sheridan’s command Custer established Camp Supply in Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) in November 1868 as a base for the coming winter campaign. On November 26th Custer stumbled across the Indian village of Black Kettle near the Washita River.

 

He attacked the camp at first light on the 27th, dividing his command into four units, sending one unit around the back of the village so that when he attacked the village head-on, the Indians would be driven into the troops on the other side. The other two detachments’ jobs were to stampede the Indian ponies: an Indian afoot was easer to kill than one on horseback.

As it was mid-winter the women, children and old folks had to try to get away in thick snow thereby impeding the warrior’s job of trying to defend them. This was the standard way of attacking an Indian encampment and on this occasion the attack was entirely successful as the village was quite small. However this approach would turn into a disaster at the Little Big Horn eight years later.

This was the first real success against the Cheyenne in two years. As most of the Southern Cheyenne reluctantly moved onto reservations after the battle, Custer’s action was seen as an even bigger success. It was this one fight that built the image of Custer as being the best Indian fighter in the army at that time.

HISTORIC CONTEXT FOR THE BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN - In 1874 Custer led a large expedition into the Black Hills where gold was discovered at French Creek near what is now the town of Custer in South Dakota. Prospectors by the hundreds rushed into the Black Hills after the press deliberately leaked the story about the discovery.

At the bidding of the civil authorities the army tried to keep the prospectors out but with very little enthusiasm and even less success. As the American Government, at the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868, had promised the Sioux that the Black Hills was to be their country in perpetuity the Indians were not best pleased.

 

This action was to lead to war between the Sioux Nation and their allies and the government of the United States. Two years after the discovery of gold in the Black Hills the situation regarding the Indians was becoming impossible.

Most of the Indians were not willing to go onto reservations and concede the Black Hills to the white man. They saw the Black Hills as their last refuge. Also, to the Sioux, this was a sacred place.

Government patience ran out in 1875 and the Indians were finally given an ultimatum to be on the reservations by January 31st 1876 or be considered ‘hostiles’. When the Sioux declined this kind offer the military were ordered to enforce government policy.

 

It was assumed by the army that the Lakota and their Cheyenne allies would gather somewhere in the Powder and Rosebud rivers area. The Indian agent told the military that they could expect to find something in the region of 800 hostiles.

 

However, 800 hostiles would constitute only 200 to 260 warriors, the remainder being women, children and old people. This proved to be a massive underestimation of the actual warrior numbers.

The first mistake the military made in planning the campaign was to accept the number of hostiles given to them by the Indian agents. This number was maybe correct at the time the military expeditions were being planned.
 

However, it did not take into account the reservation Indians that left for the summer buffalo hunt and would join "the uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull".

In fact the number of warriors participating in the battle was more like 1,500 to 2,500. Some estimates are as high as 3,500 to 4,000. However, you can take your pick, as any estimate could be right. Even after all this time no one really knows just how many Indians were there on that fateful day in June 1876. All we do know is - there were a lot!

The area to be covered by the military was massive and the main problem with fighting Indians always was “How do you find them?”. The decision was to mount a three-pronged campaign from the East, West and South.

The Southern column under the command of Brigadier General George Crook left Fort Fetterman, Wyoming Territory, on May 29th and moved north to the Powder River area. Colonel John Gibbon’s column left Fort Ellis in Western Montana on the 20th March to move east and patrol the Yellow River area.

Moving out from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, the third column started west on May 17th under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Terry. This was the column that included the 7th Cavalry commanded by Custer who at the time held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The three columns between them had 2,400 soldiers and when you add in the teamsters, Indian allies and white scouts the grand total would not have been very short of 3000 men. To take on the supposed 200 to 260 warriors, this was quite a force.

THE BATTLE OF ROSEBUD CREEK - The plan, like most complex military plans, soon started to unravel. On the 17th June a very heavy force of Sioux and Cheyenne attacked Crook’s command which was coming up the South Fork of Rosebud Creek.

The battle was tactically inconclusive but what surprised Crook was how many Indians were involved and with how much tenacity they fought. Being low on ammunition and rather shaken by the day’s events Crook withdrew his force to Big Goose Creek near present day Sheridan, Wyoming to await reinforcements. This took Crook out of the equation with drastic results for Custer and the 7th Cavalry.

THE BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN - Terry and Gibbon’s columns joined together at the mouth of the Rosebud River in early June. On the 22nd the 7th Cavalry with Custer in command was detached to make a reconnaissance down the Rosebud.

 

The rest of the Terry/Gibbon troops were to follow the Bighorn and Little Big Horn Rivers to where it was expected the Sioux and Cheyenne would be camped.

Let us put to bed right here one misconception about the 7th. It was not a ‘crack’ regiment at all. Firstly, it was a far from happy regiment with a lot of ill feeling amongst the officers about the nepotism shown by Custer.
 

Within the 31 officers in the regiment Custer had under his command two brothers, Boston and Thomas, a brother-in-law, James Calhoun, plus a nephew, Henry Reed. Custer was at odds with Major Reno and Captain Benteen, and there was not much love lost between Custer and the rest of the officers and troopers. Custer was a hard taskmaster.

 

Also, the training of the troopers was poor, as was the case for most troopers on the frontier at this stage in American history. Custer’s men were issued with Springfield 1873 model single shot carbines of old design. The men had very little target practice, only 20 rounds per year, because of the cost of ammunition.

All troopers were issued with a colt single action army revolver firing 6 shots, but sabres had been left behind on Custer’s orders. Custer felt that he was getting close to the Indian encampment on the 24th June when his scouts, both white and Indian, brought reports of a large village camped along the banks of the Little Big Horn River.

 

At this time Custer’s main concern was not to ‘spook’ the Indians before he could get into a position to attack. Custer was informed by both sets of scouts that this was a very big ‘village’ and in fact Mitch Bouyer, one of the most reliable white scouts, went so far as to tell him. “General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever seen.”

Custer was also told the same thing by his Indian scout. However, the fact was that none of the scouts had actually seen the village. What they had seen was the pony herd and smoke from cooking fires. Scouts, both red and white, had a pretty good idea of the size of a village by the amount of smoke and the size of the pony herd.

So why did Custer choose to ignore the warnings? Size, as with many things, is in the eye of the beholder. I think that Custer was probably aware that it was a quite a big village but he could not have imagined how big. There had never been such a large gathering of wild Indians before, and there was never to be a gathering of this size again.

Custer had a full regiment of Cavalry numbering 597 officers and men plus teamsters and scouts which would have brought the total to around 650 men under his direct command. I'm sure he thought he had more than enough troops to handle any number of hostiles he might find in the area.

The other matter that would have coloured his judgment was the prevailing attitude in military and civilian circles at that time, that one white man was worth ten Indians in what could be described as a ‘large engagement’.

 

Most people understood that in a one-to-one situation the warrior would have the advantage. However, when it came to a general engagement troops would always prevail because of their superior weapons and command structure.

The 7th made camp on the evening of the 24th about 15 miles from the Little Big Horn. Custer was a little on edge as he was afraid that the Indians might discover his column and up sticks and leave in a hurry.

 

However, as the Indians were there in such large numbers they thought the army would not dare attack them so had no intentions of running. This thought was also bolstered by the result of the Rosebud fight in which they assumed they had seen off the ‘white eyes’.

That night the officers gathered in Custer’s tent and serenaded him, which now seems a strange thing to do. However in those days you made your own entertainment and singing together was something quite common when out on campaign.
 

They sang many songs, one of which was ‘Home Sweet Home’ which was ‘Top of the Pops’ around that time. Upon reflection it was quite poignant as home, sweet or otherwise, for many of them would never be seen again.

Custer and the 7th arrived in the vicinity of the Indian camp on the Little Big Horn River around midday on the 25th June 1876. Custer divided his command into four units: Captain Benteen moved southwest to cover any attempted escape of the hostiles in that direction;

 

Major Reno was ordered to move north, crossing the Little Big Horn to attack the southern end of the village; the pack train, which moved slower, was to continue north until further orders were received;
 

Custer took his own part of the command north, hidden by bluffs from the eyes of the Indians, to attack the north end of the village and drive them back into Reno’s troopers.

This was the classic ‘hammer and anvil’ approach to attacking an Indian village. I feel sure that at this time Custer’s biggest concern was that the Indians would scatter and I don’t think the thought ever entered his head that they would stand and fight.

Reno started his attack around 3pm splashing across a small creek flowing into the Little Big Horn River. Reno dismounted his men to form a skirmish line to hold the Indians in place while Custer attacked them from the north end of the village.

However, he very soon realised that overwhelming numbers of warriors were attacking his command. Custer’s favourite Indian scout, Bloody Knife who was riding with Reno, was shot through the head whilst talking with him about tactics.

Reno was splattered in the face with blood and brains causing him to become totally unhinged. He ordered a precipitous retreat across the creek and up the hill on the other side. Soon after Reno reached the top of the hill Benteen’s command and the pack train came up to reinforce the rattled troopers.

Fredrick Benteen - The Indian pressure on Reno’s force began to slacken as many of the warriors made for the north end of the village to oppose the attack being mounted by Custer.

 

It was around this time that Benteen took command from a still rattled Reno to try to bring some order to the panicked troopers. Benteen, by his example, was able to get the men to form a defensive perimeter, which was to save many a trooper’s life.

Gall - Riding north, screened by the bluffs, Custer was not certain where the top of the village was, so he detached one troop to ride over the bluffs to see if they could see anything. However, as the village was over a mile in length they hit it just above the middle and most of them were killed attempting to rejoin Custer.

The Indians, led by Crazy Horse and Gall, two of the most prominent and enterprising war leaders, managed to get a very large body of warriors to ride north of the village and then turn south thereby giving them the high ground from which to attack Custer’s command.

Last Stand Hill - The end of the battle came very quickly with the Indians charging down through the floundering troopers on what is now called ‘Last Stand Hill’.

 

The fight at this stage lasted no more than 20 to 25 minutes and was, as were most Indian and soldier encounters, bloody, savage and brief. All 207 officers and men under Custer’s command were killed in what has gone down in history as ‘Custer’s Last Stand’.

History is not sure when exactly during the battle Custer was killed, but that fact is of little importance. Whether he was killed early in the battle or late would not have affected the outcome of the fight.

After the end of the ‘Last Stand’ most of the Indians went back to the south end of the village to resume the fight against the troopers on Reno Hill. By this time the perimeter of the hill had been strengthened so the Reno/Benteen command managed to hold off the attacks by the Indians for the rest of that day.

They remained pinned down for most of the following day until late on the 26th June when the rest of the Terry/Gibbon force arrived on the scene and rescued them. So ended the Battle of The Little Big Horn.

Author’s commentary - I started this account by asking the question “Why did Custer lose the Battle of the Little Big Horn?” Before we go on to the direct question let us first correct one misconception: Custer’s entire command was not wiped out as some accounts claim.

 

Custer’s command was the 7th Cavalry consisting of 597 officers and men. He also had under his command several scouts and civilians, but let us just look at the regiment’s losses.

After the battle the casualty list read 258 killed and 52 wounded. This meant fewer than half of the 7th were killed at the Battle of The Little Big Horn. Custer’s entire command was not wiped out, only the 207 troopers who were with Custer on his ride north, plus a further 51 under Reno’s command.

 

Now maybe I’m splitting hairs here, but the fact is that Custer’s entire command was not massacred. Fewer than half were killed, or massacred, whichever way you want to look at it.

So why did George Armstrong Custer lose the battle in Montana on the 25th June 1876? He made two major mistakes for which history has castigated him so let’s look at them both.

Lack of proper reconnaissance of the village and ignoring the advice of both his red and white scouts. A commander has to make a decision. That is a commander’s job. His Indian scouts told him the village was too big and held too many warriors for him to fight.

 

His white scouts gave him much the same advice. However, what none of the scouts could tell him was just how many warriors he would be facing. There had never been such a large gathering of plains Indians before, and there would never be one of this size again, but Custer was not to know that.

The information given to both Terry and Gibbon at the outset of the campaign was that they would meet, at most, 200 to 300 warriors and this information would have been passed on to Custer.
 

As he had over 600 men under his command Custer must surely have felt confident in his ability to defeat the hostiles. Also, he was ignorant of the outcome of the Rosebud Battle, which might have played a part in his decision-making, but that information was not available to him.

Custer’s main dilemma, as he saw it, was not the problem of fighting the Indians but rather not to let them discover his presence in the area causing them to disperse. This would have lead to a long protracted campaign tracking them down and was not what his superiors or his government wanted; also, being Custer, his ego must have come into play.

Splitting his forces in the face of a superior enemy -All tactical manuals advise that splitting your force in the face of a superior enemy is not a good thing to do. However, many commanders down through the ages have done just that.

When it works you are hailed as a tactical genius, when it goes wrong you are looked on as a commander who failed. One example of this maxim was Robert E. Lee’s resounding success at (17)Chancellorsville. The key thing to understand about why Custer split his command was, I think that he did not believe he was facing a superior force.

Even if it was, as his scouts told him, a big village, he could never for one moment have thought it possible to be as big as it was. All his previous knowledge of Indian encounters, which was considerable, all the current army thinking and all the advice given by the Indian agents could only lead him to one conclusion:
 

He had a big enough force to win the battle by using standard ‘hammer and anvil’ tactics. I feel sure the only thing that was exercising his mind as he rode north that afternoon was that he must not let the Indians escape.

Upon reflection and with hindsight it is now obvious that Custer made the wrong command decision on that warm afternoon in Montana so many years ago. I also feel sure that Custer would have realised he had made the wrong decision very soon into the attack.

 

The problem was that by time he realised his mistake it was too late to do anything about it. His men were tired, the horses were tired and panic would very soon have set in. So the end was a forgone conclusion.

Although George Armstrong Custer made several command decisions that can be called into question I think the main factor was ‘Custer’s Luck’, as he liked to call it, ran out on that day. However, I do think there were enough mitigating circumstances on the day to see why the disaster happened and why he made the decisions he did.

 

When governments send young men to war there is always the chance, even with the best-laid plans, that things will go wrong. On the 25th June 1786 things went very wrong for Custer and the 7th Cavalry.

On that day things started to go very wrong for the Lakota people as well. It all culminated four years later on the 29th December 1890. This was when the 7th Cavalry took revenge for their defeat at The Little Big Horn with the massacre of men, women and children of the Miniconjou and Hunkpapa Sioux at Wounded Knee, South Dakota.

FOOT NOTES-The girl he loved was Elizabeth Clift Bacon. He was first introduced to her in November 1862 but her father, Judge Daniel Bacon, was not impressed as Custer came from the ‘working class’.
 

Judge Bacon grudgingly changed his mind in 1863 when Custer was given the rank of Brevet Brigadier General and became a national hero during the Civil War. He married his ‘Libbie’ on the 9th November 1864 fourteen months after his first introduction to her.

Libbie was very beautiful and cultured and helped give Custer the standing in society that he so craved. They stayed together for the rest of his life and they were both exceedingly happy. Libbie seems to have loved the plains and outdoors military life as much as her husband.

It was Libbie who after Custer’s death was so instrumental in helping to develop the Custer myth. She never re-married preferring to stay the widow of a hero rather than becoming the wife of a nobody. Elizabeth Bacon Custer died April 4th 1933.

The youngest General in the Civil War was Galusha Pennypacker, promoted when he was only 20 to the rank of Brigadier General. He is still the youngest General ever in American military history and he remains the only general too young to vote for the president who appointed him. General Pennypacker died in 1916.

Indian Villages were extremely mobile units. The North America plains Indians could only be described as hunter/gathers so had to be mobile. Indians live in a conical tent known as a teepee (tipi) which means ‘dwelling’ or ‘dwelling place’.
 

They made their teepees from buffalo hides with lodge poles made from saplings to support the structure. A teepee had a hole at the top to let out smoke from the cooking fire and also act as ventilation.

Teepees were cool in the summer and warm in the winter in fact ideally suited to the life of the wandering plains Indians, being very easy to erect and take down.

 

An Indian village could be as small as 5 or 6 teepees or up to 250 lodges, as they were also called. Indians never stayed in one place for very long: they moved when all the grass had been eaten by their ponies; when all the wood in the area had been burnt; when game was getting scarce; when all the wild fruit had been gathered, and of course, when they just wanted a change of scenery!

Black Kettle was one very unlucky Indian. He was a leader who soon learned that it was almost impossible to fight against the whiteman. He tried to make peace and keep his people out of contact with the whites.

 

Black Kettle was given an American flag by Colonel William B. Hazen and told that if he flew it over his teepee it would indicate that his village was friendly and would save it from attack by US troopers.

Sad to say, on November 29th 1864, his camp on Sand Creek in Eastern Colorado was attacked by two regiments of Colorado Cavalry under the command of Colonel John Chivington.

The attack could only be described as a massacre, as Chivington, who was a Methodist preacher, had said earlier: “I have come to kill Indians and believe it is right and honourable to use any means under God’s heaven to kill Indians.”

Chivington claimed he had killed 500 to 600 warriors but it later became clear that only 28 warriors were killed plus 105 women and children. Black Kettle and his wife managed to escape this massacre. Custer attacked this unfortunate village again in November 1868.

On this occasion the village was camped on the banks of the Washita River in western Oklahoma, and not only flew the American flag, but also a white flag. This time poor Black Kettle and his unfortunate wife Medicine Woman were killed along with many of his followers.

This was the classic way of attacking an Indian village. It was called the ‘Hammer and Anvil’ and was used on many occasions during the Indian wars in America. The problem for the troopers was to get the Indians to stand and fight. Army commanders were always afraid that the Indians would get away and “live to fight another day.”

The basic idea was for one part of the command to drive the Indians into the arms of the waiting troops posted on the far side of the camp. The slight difference at the Washita fight was that the third and fourth column were sent to kill the Indian ponies.

An Indian on foot was not the same problem as one on horseback. Also without ponies the village could not move with any kind of speed encumbered with their women, children and old people. Indian villagers had everything any village would have; the difference was that most villages were extremely mobile.

It is always stated that the Indian alliance was made up of the Lakota, Cheyenne and Arapaho. The Lakota people were a confederation of Siouan tribes while their cousins were the Northern Cheyenne. It is now accepted the Arapaho contingent only numbered five warriors who were on a hunting trip when they ran into the Sioux.

At first the Sioux thought they were scouting for the cavalry so were inclined to kill them. However, the Arapaho managed to convince the Sioux that they were just out hunting and so happened to be in the camp when the battle took place.

The Battle of the Rosebud, or Rosebud Creek as it is sometimes called, lasted over six hours and at the end of the day Crook, by his account, still held the field. Overall losses on both sides were quite light for a fight of this length.

Crook claimed in his after action report that his casualties numbered 32 killed and 21 wounded. He also reported 13 dead Indians. However, as Indians always tried to recover the bodies of fallen comrades from the battlefield the true casualty list was probably higher.

The Indian way of fighting was different from the way the white man fought. Before the Rosebud and Big Horn Battles most Indian encounters were on the small side. In most cases Indians only fought when they thought they could win. If not, they very quickly broke off the action.

Not that they were cowards. The Indian population was small so to lose a lot of men in a battle they couldn’t win simply did not make sense. By the time of the Rosebud and the Big Horn Battles many of the Indian leaders were beginning to realise that when you fought the white man it was not so much a ‘game’ but more a matter of survival.

 

Hence Crook was taken aback by the ferocity and persistence the Indians showed on the day at the Rosebud battle. As contact in the West at this time could only be made in person Crook’s move down to Big Goose Creek would have put him approximately 100 miles south of the fight at the Little Big Horn.

He might as well have been on the other side of the moon as far as communication with Terry, Gibbon and Custer were concerned. The plan had been to bring the Terry/Gibbon columns and Crook’s together to fight the Indians. As Terry and Gibbon did not know about Crook’s fight and subsequent retreat they proceeded with the original plan.

The term ‘troopers’ was specifically used for cavalrymen. Soldiers were usually the term used for infantry and gunners would be artillery. Custer had ordered his command not to carry sabres in order to reduce weight and also to reduce any noise that might alert the Indians.

As it turned out, the sabres would have proved very useful when it came to ‘The Last Stand’. The Springfield carbines turned out to be a dead loss because of their slow rate of fire combined with a tendency to jam when overheated, and further more the troopers had only been issued with the Springfields a few weeks prior to the battle so most were not familiar with the weapon.

The colt revolver, firing six shots, was good at close range but took too long to reload once empty. Paradoxically, it was ‘the long knives’ of the cavalry that the Indians most feared. The one thing the troopers most needed but did not have for close quarter fighting was their sabres.

Custer’s command was divided as follows: Major Reno had 142 men; Captain Benteen had 100 men; Captain McDougal had 60 men and was ordered to join the pack train to augment the command of Lieutenant Gustave Mathey who had 84 troopers. Custer commanded the biggest detachment of 208 officers and men.

The Indian name for the Little Big Horn River was ‘Greasy Grass’. So it was, and still is, called by the Lakota The Battle of the Greasy Grass River.

The creek that Reno rode through has forever after been called ‘Reno Creek’. It is not in quite the same place as it was on the day of the battle, the river having changed course over many years.

Crazy Horse and Gall were two of the best war leaders of the Lakota at that time, but there would also have been many other war leaders in a camp that size. War chiefs, as they were sometimes called, could not command anyone to fight but led by pure personality and fighting ability.

The US government and people became fixated with Sitting Bull and many accounts claim he was the leader of the Sioux in the battle. In fact Sitting Bull took no part in the battle, he was considered by the Sioux to be a very important medicine man, so spent his time in prayers during the fighting.

Custer’s command started out with 208 men but one man, trumpeter John Martin, whose real name was Giovanni Martini and was an Italian immigrant, was sent back with a message to the pack train to bring up more ammunition. That saved his life and also gave him a little reflected glory as the “last man to see Custer alive.”

(The Battle of Chancellorsville was fought on May 2nd 1863 in the State of Virginia during the American Civil War. Confederate commander Robert E. Lee divided his army sending General “Stonewall” Jackson’s Corp on a 12-mile march to attack the Union right flank.

 

This was the prime example of splitting forces in the face of a superior enemy. The flank march achieved its objective and the attack was totally successful. Chancellorsville went on to be called Lee’s perfect battle. Who knows what it would have been called if he had lost!

 

All the way through his life most things had gone right for Custer, especially in the Civil War. He had three horses shot from under him but never received a scratch. That was when he came up with the expression ‘Custer’s Luck’ which most decidedly ran out at the Little Big Horn.

Gari commented on 25-May-2015 11:08 PM - I like to read other people's interpretation of the battle, thanks for putting your thoughts out there! I know that there is so much disputed and discussed with this fascinating battle, and I believe that no one is 100% right or 100% wrong.

Even the survivors of Custer fight -the Native folks- have differing views, as the battle took place over a wide area, and so few Natives would have witnessed the start and end.

The Martini message is still fascinating, I am of the belief that once Custer saw how big the village was, he knew he did not have enough men to capture the women and children -like at Washita- and use them as a human shield, and so end resistance.

So he sent the message -via Lieutenant WW Cooke- that Martini passed on asking for Benteen's troops, and, I believe McDougal and Mathey's troops -this would have given Custer over double his battalion of 208 men.
 

I don't know the parlance of the day, but I always thought that 'packs' seemed too general for a man requesting more ammunition -why not cartridges or bullets or something?

My thinking is dictated by the fact that Custer would have known he needed more men, and Benteen's 100 with extra ammo would have only given him a 50% increase...in my world, manpower was the key, not the amount of ammo. Plus, Native accounts say that Custer 'waited', some even saying if he had rode on, they'd have survived.

The waiting allowed the Natives to get up close in all the little coolies and depressions all over the battlefield. I think Custer was waiting for Benteen and the additional troops, he hadn't started the main fight, it is thought that only one company was engaged with an 'at a distant' engagement early in the battle, so he didn't need extra ammunition then, and if his plan was to seize non-combatants, the quicker he engaged the Natives with the largest force, the less ammo he'd need...he certainly didn't want a long protracted fight.

I agree with Custer luck, too. I think that was one of his major problems, I have known people like this in my life, everything goes right for them and they think they are indestructible, observers think it is courage, but it is not, it is a kind of psychotic belief that you are charmed in some way.
 

Also, you touched upon it, but I think that the condition of his troops, and more important, the horses, had a major bearing on the outcome.

Custer regularly changed his horse, true he often covered more miles than his troops whilst scouting ahead, but his horse was fresher than most of his command, so he had no 'feedback' as to how tired the command's horses were.

The whole 7th travelled hard and fast, like many field armies did at the time, but the horses, which relied on grain, were only getting perhaps a quarter of what they needed, likewise his troops were tired, and the night march just prior to the engagement was a bad move, although, I don't suppose that Custer at the time thought he'd be engaging the Native folks, as quick as did happen...

And he certainly didn't expect them to be as 'up for a fight' as they were, after the Natives fought Crook. Another thing I think important was the fact that Custer sent Reno to attack, and told him he'd be supporting him.

Then Reno's troops and a few officers saw Custer galloping AWAY from them, I think Reno's nerve went, knowing his command was on its own, and that event and disintegration of his command, meant the Natives could give their undivided attention to Custer.

 

Although, an argument could be made that once Custer had tried to capture teh women and children, the whole village would probably have headed north anyway. For sure Custer knew Reno was in a state, or else wouldn't have asked Reno to follow him or Benteen to the northern site? Anyway, I ramble, again, thanks for the read.

I can see that you have done quite a bit of research about the subject and I would like to comment on two of your points. I have always understood ‘packs’ to be the way the military at that time referred to ‘packs of ammunition’. When Custer rode north he must have soon become aware that there were a lot more Indians than he had first thought.
 

What he did know was that his men were only carrying 45 rounds each for their rifles. I believe that he sent the message for ‘the packs’ because he thought it was going to become a much bigger battle than he had first anticipated.
 

The message would also have brought him some reinforcements but as he had 208 under his immediate command I think the ammunition was more of a priority then the men.

However, along with many other bits of information about the battle, it is not quite clear just why this message was sent, so your guess is as good as mine!

 

Your other main point is about Custer telling Reno that he would support him in the attack. The ‘Hammer and Anvil’ was standard cavalry practice when attacking an Indian village. You point out quite correctly that at the battle of the Washita the two main bodies of troops did support each other.

Without knowing the size of the Indian camp at the Little Big Horn Custer made a very telling miscalculation. I’m not sure that Reno or his men were particularly worried about Custer riding away at the start of the battle as this was the plan of action: Reno’s command was to be ‘The Anvil’ and Custer’s command ‘The Hammer’.

However neither Reno nor Custer had any idea just how big the Indian camp was. The number of Indians that attacked Reno very quickly overwhelmed his command and retreat was the only option.

 

Custer did not know how far or how long he would have to ride to get to the other end of the camp before he could turn to attack the village, thereby supporting Reno.

I think maybe Custer and Reno were in agreement about the tactics but the plan fell apart very quickly because of the size of the Indian encampment. Thanks for the feedback Gari. Its great to hear from someone with a keen interest in this wonderful piece of history.

I don't think Custer "ignored" the advice of his scouts. Custer valued his scouts and relied heavily upon their counsel. Once he knew where the Indians were, Custer's original plan was to keep his regiment hidden, rest his men, send out scouts to reconnoitre the terrain around the Indian village, then attack it at dawn, on the 26th.

Everything changed when Custer, his regiment, and his scouts believed that the enemy had seen them. Hoping to get to the Indians before they decamped and fled, Custer decided to attack as soon as possible - a decision, which was partially based upon the advice of his scouts.
 

Custer's scouts told him to attack. If he waited until the morning, the village would be gone. Given Custer's fighting mentality, he could not let the enemy escape while he sat idle. If he did that, he would have suffered a more ignominious defeat; so he attacked.

Since there was no time for reconnaissance, Custer had to do a reconnaissance-in-force. In other words, he had to reconnoiter as he maneuvererd in for the attack. And that is why he sent Benteen's wing off to the left. Custer had to make sure that the hills to the left did not contain any hostiles.

 

For the ensuing battle, Custer did not really divide his regiment in three. Benteen's scout to the left was just that - a scout. Custer expected and anticipated Benteen's battalion to be in the fight. As Napoleon once wrote: "When you want to fight a battle, assemble all your forces, do not neglect any; one battalion can sometimes decide the day".

 

Well, Custer tried to assemble his forces - the written order to Benteen is the famous testimony to that. Reno's battalion had its own mission. As you mentioned, Custer was employing the "hammer-and-anvil" tactic, a tactic which might have worked had Reno carried through with it.

In the end, both Reno and Benteen 'neglected' Custer, and Benteen's one battalion could have saved the day. To quote General Nelson Miles, "It's hard to win a battle when 5/7th's of your fighting force is out of the fight."

If I had to choose errors which Custer committed at the Little Big Horn, I could only come up with maybe two. Firstly, Custer should have gave Major Reno more specific orders and instructions before he sent him off to charge the village.

Custer should have told Reno something like, "Attack the village. I'm taking my battalions up the bluffs and down to the other end where I will attack. I will attempt to capture the women and children. if you are repulsed, hold your ground and keep them occupied until I get to the other end."

Instructions akin to that, would have given Reno a better sense of the overall plan, as well as more confidence in his action. As it were, during the hottest, deadliest part of the Reno fight, the Major didn't even know where Custer was; he thought he was all alone.

Custer's second error, and it's not really a fault of his own, was having Major Reno as a second-in-command. Reno did not like Custer; he even said that he had "no confidence in him (Custer) as a leader." Unfounded or not, that kind of view of your commander will definitely affect how you fight for him on the battlefield.

People will say what they will, but the facts are all out there - Reno's performance at the Little Big Horn was shockingly shameful. If Custer would have had someone like Myles Keogh, Captain Yates, or his brother Tom lead the initial attack on the Indian village, the outcome of the battle would have been different indeed.

Custer certainly was, and still is after all these years a highly divisive person. I can tell from your writing you have studied the subject in detail and have come to slightly different conclusions from mine.

I agree that Custer thought that the Indians had discovered that the 7th Cavalry were in the area and that led Custer to formulate his plan of attack without making much reconnaissance.
 

Not that I think that reconnaissance was one of George Armstrong’s strong points looking at his Civil War record. It was more like, ‘There’s the enemy, charge!’ However, I am of the opinion that his scouts, both red and white, made it clear to Custer that this was a much bigger camp than usual.

The scouts made this assumption on the size of the Indians’ horse herd and the amount of smoke from the cooking fires of the Indians. It was these two observations that indicated to the scouts that this was a very large camp indeed.

As a camp of this size had never been seen before Custer chose to ignore their advice with disastrous results. You suggest that Custer should have given Reno more specific orders, but as ‘Hammer-and-Anvil’ was the accepted way at that time of attacking Indian villages I am sure that Reno would have been well versed with this manoeuvre.

I think the real problem Reno faced was the sheer number of Indians that he encountered and I assume that no matter what Reno might have ordered his men to do they would have ‘skedaddled’ on mass, as they did! The 7th Cavalry were neither well trained nor highly motivated and like most Cavalry of that time were usually enlisted back in the East then shipped off to the Western frontiers.

Most of the troopers would have been like ‘fish out of water’ in that sort of country to say nothing of facing some of the most ferocious Indians in the West.

 

When Benteen arrived on the hilltop overlooking the bottom end of the Indian camp, where most of Reno’s command ended up, I think he showed remarkable coolness and composure under very trying conditions.

 

If Benteen had not assumed command upon finding that Reno had gone totally to pieces I think the Little Big Horn disaster would have been much much worse. You are quite correct in saying that Reno and Custer were not close, in fact they hated each other.

 

Also, there was a lot of discontent with the command structure of the 7th Cavalry because of Custer’s nepotism. There are many, many different interpretations about what really happened at the ‘Battle of the Little Big Horn’ but the most fascinating part is that after 140 years we are still discussing it! Thanks for commenting on my website.

I have read that Custer decided to not be slowed by the Gatlin Gun which was carriage mounted. Another link in the chain of events. I think this was one of his better decisions, as Gatling Guns were not at that time very reliable.
 

It certainly would have slowed them down over the kind of terrain the 7th had to cover to reach the battlefield. I also believe it would have been totally useless in Indian Warfare.

http://www.therealwildwest.com/Stories/Why_did_Custer_lose_the_Battle_of_the_Little_Bighorn.htm

Turkic migration refers to the expansion of the Turkic tribes and Turkic languages into Central Asia, Eastern Europe and West Asia, mainly between the 6th and 11th centuries.

Identified Turkic tribes were known by the 6th century, and by the 10th century most of Central Asia was settled by Turkic tribes. The Seljuq dynasty settled in Anatolia starting in the 11th century, ultimately resulting in permanent Turkic settlement and presence there.

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Meanwhile, other Turkic tribes either ultimately formed independent nations, such as Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, or new enclaves within other nations, such as Chuvashia, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, the Crimean Tatars, the Uyghurs in China, and the Sakha Republic Siberia.

 

Proposals for the homeland of the Turkic peoples and their language are far-ranging, from the Transcaspian steppe to Northeastern Asia (Manchuria). According to Yunusbayev et al. (2015), genetic evidence points to an origin in the region near South Siberia and Mongolia as the "Inner Asian Homeland" of the Turkic ethnicity.
 

Similarly several linguists, including Juha Janhunen, Roger Blench and Matthew Spriggs, suggest that Mongolia is the homeland of the early Turkic language.

According to Robbeets, the Turkic people descend from people who lived in a region extending from present-day South Siberia and Mongolia to the West Liao River Basin (modern Manchuria).

Authors Joo-Yup Lee and Shuntu Kuang analyzed 10 years of genetic research on Turkic people and compiled scholarly information about Turkic origins, and said that the early and medieval Turks were a heterogeneous group and that the Turkification of Eurasia was a result of language diffusion, not a migration of homogeneous population.

Identity of the Xiongnu (3rd c. BCE - 1st c. CE) - The Han Dynasty and the Xiongnu - The Xiongnu, appear as nomadic tribes on the plains of the Far East north of the Great Wall of China, which was constructed as a fortified border during essentially Han dynasty China (206 BCE-220 CE) (though started earlier) and the Xiongnu.

They lived in Mongolia or along the upper Yenisei in Siberia (the area of the contemporary Tuvan language), and are known from historical sources.

 

The Han chronicle of the Xiongnu, included in the Records of the Grand Historian of the second century BCE, traces a legendary history of them back a thousand years before the Han to a legendary ancestor, Chunwei, a supposed descendant of the Chinese rulers of the Xia dynasty (c. 2070 – c. 1600 BCE).

Chunwei lived among the "Mountain Barbarians" Xianyun or Hunzhu. Xianyun and Hunzhu's names may connect them to the Turkic people, who later were said to have been iron-workers and to have kept a national shrine in a mountain cave in Mongolia.

The Xiongnu were a tribal confederation of nomadic peoples who, according to ancient Chinese sources, inhabited the eastern Eurasian Steppe from the 3rd century BCE to the late 1st century CE. Chinese sources report that Modu Chanyu, the supreme leader after 209 BC, founded the Xiongnu Empire.

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Apparently the Xiongnu comprised a number of tribes and geographic groups, not all of which were probably Turkic (considering the later mixed ethnicity).

 

The Records of the Grand Historian mention the Mianshu, Hunrong and Diyuan west of Long; the Yiqu, Dali, Wiezhi and Quyan north of the Qi and Liang mountains and Jing and Qi Rivers; the Forest Barbarians and Loufan north of Jin and the Eastern Barbarians and Mountain Barbarians north of Yan. Later the treatise mentions others.

There were apparently many of the latter. At the end of the Xia, about 1569 BCE by the reckoning of the Records of the Grand Historian, the Chinese founded a city, Bin, among the Rong tribe of barbarians. In 1269 the Rong and the Di forced the relocation of Bin.

 

About 1169 BCE the Quanyishi tribe was attacked by the Zhou Dynasty, which in 1159 forced all the barbarians into "the submissive wastes" north of the Jing and Luo Rivers. In 969 BCE "King Mu attacked the Quanrong and brought back with him four white wolves and four white deer ...." The early Turkic peoples believed that shamans could shape-shift into wolves.

In 769 Marquis Shen of the Zhou enlisted the assistance of the Quanrong in rebelling against the emperor You. The barbarians did not then withdraw but took Jiaohuo between the Jing and Wei Rivers and from there went marauding into central China, but were driven out.

In 704 the Mountain Barbarians marauded through Yan, and in 660 BC attacked the Zhou emperor Xiang in Luo. He had discarded a barbarian queen. The barbarians put another on the throne. They went on plundering until driven out in 656 BC.

Subsequently the Chinese drove out the Di and subordinated all the Xiongnu (temporarily at least). Around 456 BC the Chinese took Dai from them. The Yiqu tribe tried building fortifications but lost them to the Chinese in this period of their expansion.

 

Here the detail of the narrative increases as it deals with the rise of the Qin Dynasty of 221-206 BCE, which is no doubt mainly historical rather than legendary. The Qin kept the Xiongnu at bay.

Qin's campaign against the Xiongnu of 215 BCE kept the Xiongnu at bay, driving them out of and seizing the Ordos region. Problems re-emerged after the Qin Dynasty. The Xiong-nu attacked Shanxi of the Han in 201 BCE.
 

Emperor Gaozu of Han bought them off with jade, silk and a Chinese wife for the Shanyu, or leader. Relations with the Xiongnu continued to be troubled and in 133 BC Emperor Wu of Han proceeded against them with 300,000 men.

Eighty-one years and fourteen expeditions later in 52 BC the southern Xiongnu surrendered and the northern desisted from raiding. The Han Dynasty military expeditions continued near the frontier of China, in the Han–Xiongnu War, and in 89 AD the Xiongnu state was defeated and soon ended.

Attempts to identify the Xiongnu with later groups of the western Eurasian Steppe remain controversial. Scythians and Sarmatians were concurrently to the west.

 

The identity of the ethnic core of Xiongnu has been a subject of varied hypotheses, because only a few words, mainly titles and personal names, were preserved in the Chinese sources.

The name Xiongnu may be cognate with that of the Huns or the Huna, although this is disputed. Other linguistic links – all of them also controversial – proposed by scholars include Iranian, Mongolic, Turkic, Uralic,Yeniseian, Tibeto-Burman or multi-ethnic.

Five Hu - The early-fourth-century saw a rebellion, with sacking of northern Chinese cities, by the Xiong-nu. However, most of the Xiongnu were later wiped out by the Chinese Ran Wei state (350–352) after Ran Min's cull order following the end of the Wei–Jie war, which annihilated three of the "Five Hu" tribes.

In that century some of the Xiong-nu broke away and joined with the Di as the Five Hu, or "Five Barbarian Peoples" (Wu Hu 五胡), as the Chinese called them, for purposes of ruling the north of China.

The Five Hu were the Xiong-nu, Jie, Zhi, Chiang people and Xianbei, although different groups of historians and historiographers have their own definitions. Identity of the Huns (4th-6th c. CE)- The Hunnic Empire of about AD 450 as seen by European authors.

 

The star marks where the nomadic Huns chose to encamp, the Hungarian plain, a sort of enclave of steppe country in a mountainous region. The migration of the Bulgars after the fall of Old Great Bulgaria in the 7th century.

The Huns were a nomadic people who lived in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, between the 4th and 6th century AD.
 

According to European tradition, they were first reported living east of the Volga River, in an area that was part of Scythia at the time; the Huns' arrival is associated with the migration westward of an Indo-Iranian people, the Alans.

By 370 AD, the Huns had arrived on the Volga, and by 430 the Huns had established a vast, if short-lived, dominion in Europe, conquering the Goths and many other Germanic peoples living outside of Roman borders, and causing many others to flee into Roman territory.

The actual identity of the Huns is still debated. Concerning the cultural genesis of the Huns, the Cambridge Ancient History of China asserts: "Beginning in about the eighth century BC, throughout inner Asia horse-riding pastoral communities appeared, giving origin to warrior societies."
 

These were part of a larger belt of "equestrian pastoral peoples" stretching from the Black Sea to Mongolia, and known to the Greeks as the Scythians.

 

The Scythians in the west were Iranian, speaking one among very many languages ultimately descended from Proto-Indo-European, whose speakers themselves are also hypothesised to have occupied the Pontic-Caspian Steppe, according to the leading theory of Indo-European origins, the Kurgan model.

The communities of the northern belt north of China, a historically Inner Mongolia region were the Proto-Xiongnu. The Huns have often been considered a Turkic people, and sometimes associated with the Xiongnu. While in Europe, the Huns incorporated others, such as Goths, Slavs, and Alans.

One especially severe round of nomadic rebellion in the early 4th century has led to the certain identification of the Xiongnu with the Huns. A letter (Letter II) written in the ancient Sogdian language excavated from a Han Dynasty watchtower in 1911 identified the perpetrators of these events as the xwn, "Huns", supporting de Guignes' 1758 identification.

The equivalence was not without its critics, notably Otto J. Maenchen-Helfen, who argued that xwn was a general name and could refer to anyone. More recently other evidence was noticed: Zhu Fahu, a monk, translated Sanskrit Hūṇa in the Tathāgataguhya Sūtra and in the Lalitavistara Sūtra as "Xiongnu". Vaissière reconstructs the pronunciation as *Xiwong nuo.

Moreover, the Book of Wei states that the king of the Xiongnu killed the king of Sogdia and took the country, an event datable to the time of the Huns, who did exactly that; in short, "... the name of the Huns is a precise referent and not generic."

Orosius has the Huns riding down upon the Ostrogoths in the year AD 377 totally by surprise, "long shut off by inaccessible mountains" and apparently of hitherto unsuspected existence.

Whatever may have been his reasons for making such a statement, he and Goths might have found ample reference to the Huns in the classical geographers, such as Pliny and Ptolemy; in fact, some were already in Europe. The mountains were mythical as the Ostrogoths were located on the Pontic steppe, an easy target for Hunnic cavalry.

The Huns were not literate (according to Procopius) and left nothing linguistic with which to identify them except their names, which derive from Germanic, Iranian, Turkic, unknown and a mixture.

Some, such as Ultinčur and Alpilčur, are like Turkish names ending in -čor, Pecheneg names in -tzour and Kirghiz names in -čoro. Names ending in -gur, such as Utigur and Onogur, and -gir, such as Ultingir, are like Turkish names of the same endings.

One tribe of the Huns called themselves the Acatir (Greek Akatiroi, Latin Acatiri), which Wilhelm Tomaschek derived from Agac-ari, "forest men", reminiscent of the "Forest Barbarians" of the Shi-Ji. The Agaj-eri are mentioned in an AD 1245 Turko-Arabian Dictionary.

The name Agac-eri occurred in later history in Anatolia and Khuzistan (e.g. city of Aghajari). Maenchen-Helfen rejects this etymology on the grounds that g is not k and there appears to be no linguistic rule to make the connection. Herodotus, however, mentions the Agathyrsi, whom Latham connects with some early Acatiri in Dacia.

Jordanes places the "most mighty race of the Acatziri, ignorant of agriculture, which lives upon its herds and upon hunting" south of the Aesti (in part Prussians). A number of sources identify the Bulgars with the Huns. Another branch were the Saviri, or Sabir people.

 

The strongest candidate for a remnant of the speakers of the Hunnic language are the Chuvash, who are on or near the location of the Volga Bulgars.

 

The end of the Huns as a Eurasian political unity is not known. A token end point for the Huns of the west, perhaps all the Huns, is the fixation of the head of Dengizich, a son of Attila, on a pole at Constantinople in 469.

He had been defeated in Thrace in that year by Anagastes, a Gothic general in the service of the Roman Empire. Various peoples continued to call themselves Huns even though acting autonomously, such as the Sabir people.
 

According to the Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, the last state to call itself Hunnic was the Caucasian Kingdom of the Huns, visited in 682 by an Albanian bishop.

Many of these peoples were Turkic but meanwhile other coalitions leading to explicitly named Turkic empires had been forming on the original range of the Xiong-nu. Their expansion has been conventionally called the "Turkic migration" but in fact the Turkics had already been "migrating" for some centuries.

Göktürks (5th-8th c.) - The term Türk or Türküt, corresponding to the Chinese name tu-jue, was first used as an endonym in the Orkhon inscriptions of the Göktürks (English: 'Celestial Turks') of Central Asia.
 

The first reference to "Turks" (Tujue) appears in Chinese sources of the 6th century. The earliest evidence of Turkic languages as a separate group comes from the Orkhon inscriptions of the early 8th century.

However, the Chinese name "tie-le", corresponding to "Türük", was used much earlier, around the period when the Mongolic tribes Tuoba and Rouran vied for hegemony over the Mongolian steppes around the 5th and 6th centuries.

The precise date of the initial expansion from the early homeland remains unknown. The first state known as "Turk", giving its name to the many states and peoples afterwards, was that of the Göktürks (gök = 'blue' or 'celestial', however in this context "gök" refers to the direction "east". Therefore, Gokturks are the Eastern Turks) in the 6th century.

The head of the Ashina clan led his people from Li-jien (modern Zhelaizhai) to the Rouran seeking inclusion in their confederacy and protection from China. His tribe comprised famed metal smiths and was granted land near a mountain quarry that looked like a helmet, from which they got their name 突厥.
 

A century later their power had increased such that they conquered the Rouruan and set about establishing a Göktürk Empire. The Turkic family of languages were spoken by Bulgars, Pechenegs, Cumans, Dingling, Gaoche peoples long before the Göktürk Khanate came into prominence.
 

Many groups speaking 'Turkic' languages never adopted the name "Turk" for their own identity. Among the peoples that came under Göktürk dominance and adopted its political culture and lingua-franca, the name "Turk" wasn't always the preferred identity.

In other words, there wasn't a unified movement westward by a culture under one unified ethnic identity, such as that of the Mongol conquest of Eurasia under the Chinggisid political leadership.
 

Rather, Turkic languages – both peripheral ones like the Bulgar branch and central ones like the Oghuz and Karluk-Chagatai branches – drifted westward by autonomous movements of diverse tribes and migrating traders, soldiers and townspeople, outnumbering and assimilating non-Turkic indigenous peoples along the way.

And being partly replaced by other language families that have become prominent in the east, such as Mongolic languages on the Mongolian steppes, Indo-Aryan languages in the Indian subcontinent, and Persian in the Central Iranian Plateau.

Later Turkic peoples - Uyghur Khaganate in geopolitical context c. AD 800 - Later Turkic peoples include the Karluks (mainly 8th century), Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, Oghuz (or Guz, Uz, Ghuzz, etc.) Turks, and Turkmens.
 

As these peoples were founding states in the area between Mongolia and Transoxiana, they came into contact with Muslims, and most gradually adopted Islam. However, there were also some other groups of Turkic people who belonged to other religions, including Christians, Jews (see Khazars), Buddhists, and Zoroastrians.

Turkmens -While the Karakhanid state remained in this territory until its conquest by Genghis Khan, the Turkmen group of tribes was formed around the core of westward Oghuz. The name "Turkmen" originally simply meant "I am Turk" in the language of the diverse tribes living between the Karakhanid and Samanid states.

 

Thus, the ethnic consciousness among some, but not all Turkic tribes as "Turkmens" in the Islamic era came long after the fall of the non-Muslim Gokturk (and Eastern and Western) Khanates.

The name "Turk" in the Islamic era became an identity that grouped Islamized Turkic tribes in contradistinction to Turkic tribes that were not Muslim (that mostly have been referred to as "Tatar"), such as the Nestorian Naiman (which became a major founding stock for the Muslim Kazakh nation) and Buddhist Tuvans.

Thus the ethnonym "Turk" for the diverse Islamized Turkic tribes somehow served the same function as the name "Tajik" did for the diverse Iranian peoples who converted to Islam and adopted Persian as their lingua-franca.

Both names first and foremost labeled Muslimness, and to a lesser extent, common language and ethnic culture. Long after the departure of the Turkmens from Transoxiana towards the Karakum and Caucasus, consciousness associated with the name "Turk" still remained, as Chagatay and Timurid period Central Asia was called "Turkestan" and the Chagatay language called "Turki", even though the people only referred to themselves as "Mughals", "Sarts", "Taranchis" and "Tajiks".

This name "Turk", was not commonly used by most groups of the Kypchak branch, such as the Kazakhs, although they are closely related to the Oghuz (Turkmens) and Karluks (Karakhanids, Sarts, Uyghurs).

Neither did Bulgars (Kazan Tatars, Chuvash) and non-Muslim Turkic groups (Tuvans, Yakuts, Yugurs) come close to adopting the ethnonym "Turk" in its Islamic Era sense.

 

Among the Karakhanid period Turkmen tribes rose the Atabeg Seljuq of the Kinik tribe, whose dynasty grew into a great Islamic empire stretching from India to Anatolia.

Turkic soldiers in the army of the Abbasid caliphs emerged as the de facto rulers of much of the Muslim Middle East (apart from Syria and North Africa) from the 13th century.

 

The Oghuz and other tribes captured and dominated various countries under the leadership of the Seljuk dynasty, and eventually captured the territories of the Abbasid dynasty and the Byzantine Empire.

Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz and Uyghurs were struggling with one another and with the Chinese Empire. The Kyrgyz people ultimately settled in the region now referred to as Kyrgyzstan.

 

The Batu hordes conquered the Volga Bulgars in what is today Tatarstan and Kypchaks in what is now Southern Russia, following the westward sweep of the Mongols in the 13th century.

 

Other Bulgars settled in Europe in the 7-8th centuries, but were assimilated by the Slavs, giving the name to the Bulgarians and the Slavic Bulgarian language.

It was under Seljuq suzerainty that numerous Turkmen tribes, especially those that came through the Caucasus via Azerbaijan, acquired fiefdoms (beyliks) in newly conquered areas of Anatolia, Iraq and even the Levant.
 

Thus, the ancestors of the founding stock of the modern Turkish nation were most closely related to the Oghuz Turkmen groups that settled in the Caucasus and later became the Azerbaijani nation.

By early modern times, the name "Turkestan" has several definitions: land of sedentary Turkic-speaking townspeople that have been subjects of the Central Asian Chagatayids, i.e. Sarts, Central Asian Mughals, Central Asian Timurids, Uyghurs of Chinese Turkestan and the later invading Tatars that came to be known as Uzbeks; This area roughly coincides with "Khorasan" in the widest sense, plus Tarim Basin which was known as Chinese Turkestan.

It is ethnically diverse, and includes homelands of non-Turkic peoples like the Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Dungans, Dzungars. Turkic peoples of the Kypchak branch, i.e. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, are not normally considered "Turkestanis" but are also populous (as pastoralists) in many parts of Turkestan, a specific district governed by a 17th-century Kazakh Khan, in modern-day Kazakhstan, which were more sedentary than other Kazakh areas, and were populated by towns-dwelling Sarts

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkic_migration